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Abstract
A new type of service, known as a Location Based Service (LBS), is emerging that
incorporates users’ location information, and many of these LBSs operate over the
Internet. However, the potential misuse of this location information is a serious
concern. Therefore, the main goal of this thesis is to develop techniques, which
increase users’ security and privacy, for use with these LBSs.
The first technique that we propose is a three-party protocol that is used to mutu-
ally identify and authenticate users, LBSs, and a trusted middleware infrastructure
that is responsible for managing the users’ identity and location information. This
protocol enables users to simultaneously identify and authenticate themselves to the
infrastructure using real identities, and to the LBSs using pseudonyms. This pro-
tocol can be subsequently used to securely exchange messages containing location
information.
The second technique that we propose is an access control model that enables
users to create permissions that specify which users and LBSs are entitled to obtain
location information about which other users, under what circumstances the location
information is released to the users and LBSs, and the accuracy of any location
information that is released to the users and LBSs.
The third technique that we propose is a blurring algorithm that performs spa-
tial blurring on users’ location information. It does not perform temporal blurring,
because this reduces an LBS’s ability to offer a useful service. Instead, our blurring
algorithm introduces a new parameter that specifies the frequency with which lo-
cation information is released for a particular user. This frequency parameter is a
function of the size of the blurred location.
These three techniques can be used as part of an overall solution for providing
users with increased security while using LBSs that operate over the Internet.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Currently there are many services that may be invoked using the Internet. In general,
these services, and the Internet, have no knowledge or concept of location. However,
our usage of the Internet is changing and evolving. We no longer access it solely from
desktop computers that are in fixed locations. More and more we access it using
mobile devices. Using these mobile devices we are able to maintain our connection
to the Internet while on the move. Another recent development is the ability to
obtain the mobile device’s current location. This can be obtained by either the
mobile device itself, or by the network within which it is operating. This connected
mobility together with the location awareness enables a new range of services, known
as Location Based Services (LBSs), which take the mobile device’s location into
consideration when providing the service.
In this chapter we provide an introduction to mobile devices and positioning
technologies. These are both significant enablers of LBSs. We then describe the
problem statement that this thesis addresses, together with the main goals of this
thesis. Finally, we will outline the unique contributions of this thesis.
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1.2 Enablers
The two most significant enablers of LBSs are mobile devices and positioning tech-
nologies.
1.2.1 Mobile Devices
We consider that mobile devices in the context of this thesis are widely available
personal communication devices that are not restricted to use in a single location. In
particular, we consider that mobile devices are either mobile phones, smart phones,
or Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). However, as technological advancements are
made the differences between these three types of mobile devices decrease, and it
becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between them.
Mobile devices are continuously experiencing significant technological advance-
ments. For example, their size and mass has decreased dramatically, while their
computational power, input and output capabilities, and communication bandwidth
have all increased rapidly. The vast majority of mobile devices are now capable of
connecting to the Internet and viewing web pages. Therefore, they are a significant
enabler of LBSs, because they enable users to invoke LBSs regardless of where these
users are located.
Current mobile phones are small, lightweight devices, which contain relatively
large colour displays, and have integrated digital cameras. They provide users with
all the functionality that is needed to make and receive both voice and video calls.
They also enable users to avail of a wide range of multimedia services, such as text,
picture, and email messaging. They often contain simple applications, such as task
lists and calculators.
Smart phones are mobile devices that are built upon the capabilities of mobile
phones. Therefore, they contain all the phone functionality found in mobile phones.
However, the feature of smart phones that differentiates them from standard mobile
phones is the fact that smart phones contain an accessible operating system that
enables users to install their own applications. Since smart phones contain more
functional operating systems, they generally require more powerful hardware than
2
standard mobile phones. Consequently, smart phones are often heavier and larger
than mobile phones.
Originally PDAs were designed to replace the traditional paper based personal
organisers. They normally contain an operating system, and they have diary, con-
tacts list, task list, and notes applications. Current PDAs have the same capabilities
as smart phones, but they normally have much larger screens. Users normally inter-
act with PDAs by either touching their screens directly or by using a stylus on their
screens. PDAs are the most powerful and feature rich mobile devices, and therefore
they are the heaviest and largest mobile devices.
The ownership and usage of mobile devices has increased dramatically in recent
years. By the middle of 2008 the mobile device penetration rate in Ireland was
121%, and the mobile device penetration rate in European was 118% [23]. Indeed,
mobile devices have become an integral part of our lives!
1.2.2 Positioning Technologies
Positioning technologies make it possible to locate mobile devices, and there have
been significant advancements in this area recently. They are the single most impor-
tant enablers of LBSs, because without them it is almost impossible to create mean-
ingful LBSs. The positioning technologies that are most suitable for use with LBSs
are scalable, relatively cheap, and easily integrated with mobile devices. There are
two broad categories of positioning technologies that have these properties. These
are satellite based positioning technologies and mobile phone network based posi-
tioning technologies.
The basic concept of the satellite based positioning technologies is that a location
in three-dimensional space can be precisely located by finding the intersection of four
spheres. The centre of each sphere represents a satellite, and the radius of the sphere
represents the distance to the positioning device. The most widely available global
satellite based positioning system is the Global Positioning System (GPS) [59]. It
was developed by the American Department of Defence to enable the military forces
to accurately determine their position, their velocity, and the time, using a common
reference system anywhere on or above the Earth. GPS was subsequently made
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available for use by the general public, although it still remains under military
control. The main disadvantage of GPS in the context of LBSs is that it only
works well in environments where the positioning device has a clear view of the sky.
Therefore, it does not work well in built-up urban areas, and it does not work inside
buildings.
The mobile phone network based positioning technologies are based on mobile
phone network infrastructures rather than satellite infrastructures. Mobile phone
network operators throughout the world have established cellular networks, and
these mobile phone networks cover vast areas of land. In particular, they normally
cover areas of land that are populated by humans. Therefore, these networks offer
the potential of being able to locate mobile devices that are operating within them.
The network operators have recognised this potential since the development of the
initial GSM networks. Since then, many different methods for locating mobile de-
vices within GSM and UMTS networks have been developed [1]. For example, both
the Time of Arrival method and the Enhanced Observed Time Difference method
calculate the mobile device’s location by measuring the times required for signals
to travel between the mobile phone network infrastructure and the mobile device.
These times are used to calculate distances, and the mobile device’s location is
obtained by calculating the intersection of these distances from the mobile phone
network infrastructure. The main disadvantages of these methods are that they
require upgrades to both the users’ mobile devices and the mobile phone network
infrastructure, and their accuracy varies depending on the mobile phone network
topology.
1.3 Location Based Services
These new mobile devices, which can be combined with new positioning technolo-
gies, enable a completely new type of service to be created. This new type of service
is known as an LBS. These LBSs can provide users with information that may be tai-
lored to their current locations. Alternatively, these LBSs can tailor the information
based on the location of some other person of interest to the user.
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In practice there are many different forms of LBSs, therefore a more general
definition of an LBS is:
An LBS is a service that takes into consideration the location of the user
who invoked the service, and/or the location or locations of some other
entity or entities, when it is providing the service.
An interesting aspect of this definition is that the type of entity or entities that a
user may be interested in locating is very broad. Possible examples of these entities
include other people, animals, vehicles, objects, and places.
There are many existing examples of LBSs that demonstrate their potential.
For example, one of the first LBSs developed was a tourist guide called Cyberguide
[2]. This LBS enables users in Atlanta to view their current location, and to locate
nearby Points of Interest (PoI). For each PoI, they can obtain related information,
and leave comments for other users to view. They can also create customised tours
of the city for themselves based on their preferences. Similar tourist guide LBSs
have also been developed for Lancaster [22] and Adelaide [69].
A conference assistant is presented in [25] that forms the basis of an LBS. The
user invokes this LBS when he/she first enters the conference venue. After registering
his/her contact details, the user specifies his/her research interests. The user can
also inform the LBS which other attendees are his/her colleagues. Throughout
the conference, the LBS provides the user with location details, and background
material, for presentations and demonstrations that may be of interest.
There are currently several companies offering vehicle tracking LBSs on a com-
mercial basis. These LBSs are designed for individuals with valuable cars, or for
company fleets. They allow the vehicles to be located in real-time using a web
interface.
Similarly, there are several companies offering child tracking LBSs on a commer-
cial basis. These LBSs enable parents to locate their children in real-time using a
web interface. The children who are locatable must be in possession of a mobile
device or some purpose built hardware that contains positioning technology.
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1.4 Problem Statement and Goals
Security, and in particular privacy, continues to be the main concern in the area of
eCommerce [32], and it is also critical for mCommerce, particularly in the context
of LBSs. Users tend to be reluctant to provide personal location information, which
we refer to as sightings, to third party LBSs [9], and they may require significant
compensation for these sightings [24]. In fact, sightings are so critical to a user’s
privacy that they are specifically covered by the EU directive on the processing and
storage of personal data [31]. Potential misuse of sightings raises some important
issues. Sightings may fall into the hands of someone with malicious intentions, and
this may place users in life threatening situations. Therefore, users must be able to
trust network operators, LBSs, and other users not to misuse their sightings.
The existing LBSs that operate over the Internet are based on a trust model
where there is complete trust between both the user and the network operator, and
between the network operator and the LBS. Indeed, there are very few of these
LBSs that operate over the Internet because it is difficult for them to obtain the
trust of the network operator. Furthermore, once an LBS has obtained the trust of
the network operator then the LBS can obtain accurate sightings of any user at any
time. Therefore, the current trust model between network operators and LBSs is an
all-or-nothing trust model. Consequently, the trust model between users and LBSs
is also an all-or-nothing trust model.
A more desirable approach is to create a new trust model that reduces and limits
the trust required between the network operator and the LBS. This in turn would
reduce and limit the trust required between the user and the LBS. The effect of this
proposed trust model is that it would become easier for LBSs to obtain sightings
of users, since the users would have control over the release of their sightings. This
would empower the rapid creation of Internet based LBSs. Indeed, it is possible that
any existing website could become LBS enabled. For example, an existing website
belonging to a bank could become an LBS by enabling users to locate their nearest
automatic teller machines.
The goal of creating a new trust model that reduces and limits the amount of
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trust that users must have in network operators, LBSs, and other users is extremely
broad. It is also possible that it can never be fully realised. The most significant issue
associated with achieving this goal is the secure management of identity information
and location information. Therefore, the main goals of this thesis are to develop
security techniques for use with LBSs. In particular, we will describe an architecture
and protocol, an access control model, and a sighting blurring algorithm which all
increase users’ security.
1.4.1 Architecture and Protocol
One important security feature that enables users to reduce the amount of trust
that they must place in LBSs is the ability to hide their identities, and hence access
the LBSs in an anonymous manner. This will not hinder many LBSs from offering a
useful service, such as LBSs that enable a user to locate the nearest petrol station.
However, many LBSs may require some form of persistent identification for users,
such as LBSs that enable a user to locate his/her friends. In these circumstances
users can identify themselves to the LBSs using pseudonyms [65].
In order for a user to successfully invoke an LBS over the Internet several different
entities will need to communicate with each other. This creates opportunities for
a party with malicious intentions to either eavesdrop on the communications, or
to interfere with the communications. The risks posed by these opportunities can
be reduced by using security techniques to ensure that all entities are correctly
identified and authenticated to each other, and that the confidentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation of all subsequent communications can be ensured.
Therefore, the first goal of this thesis is to develop an architecture and protocol
that enables users with multiple identities to securely communicate with LBSs and
other users.
1.4.2 Access Control Model
Another important security feature that enables users to reduce the amount of trust
that they must place in both LBSs and other users is the ability to control the release
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of their sightings by using an access control model. A suitable access control model
should be based on a system where users create permissions that specify which LBSs
and other users are entitled to obtain their sightings, under what circumstances these
sightings are obtainable, and the maximum accuracy of these sightings. The access
control model is then responsible for releasing users’ sightings in accordance with
their permissions.
Therefore, the second goal of this thesis is to develop an access control model
that controls the release of users’ sightings.
1.4.3 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
The final security feature that we consider that enables users to reduce the amount
of trust that they must place in both LBSs and other users is the ability to reduce the
accuracy of their sightings. We refer to this process as sighting blurring. Many LBSs
will not be hindered from offering useful services by sighting blurring, because these
LBSs will not require very accurate sightings. For example, an LBS that enables
a user to locate all touristic attractions within 100,000m does not need the user’s
sightings with an accuracy greater than 1,000m.
Therefore, the third goal of this thesis is to develop a sighting blurring algorithm
that reduces the accuracy of users’ sightings.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
There are three major contributions of our work that are described in this thesis.
1.5.1 Architecture and Protocol
We have developed an architecture for users, LBSs, and an infrastructure, which
is a trusted middleware entity that facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the
Internet in a secure manner. In particular, the infrastructure provides common
functionality regarding the users’ identity information and sighting information.
We have also developed a protocol that uses this architecture, so that users,
LBSs, and an infrastructure can achieve three-party mutual identification and au-
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thentication. This protocol allows users to simultaneously identify and authenti-
cate themselves to the infrastructure using a real identity, and to the LBS using a
pseudonym. Indeed, each user can be identified and authenticated using a different
pseudonym with each LBS. This is achieved without requiring the mobile device to
have significantly greater resources, and without the need for additional messages to
be exchanged. This usage of pseudonyms with LBSs provides users with increased
privacy without necessarily reducing the usefulness of the LBSs. The confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages can be guaranteed, and
we described how this can be used so that a user receives sighting information from
an LBS, which in turn receives this sighting information from the infrastructure.
1.5.2 Access Control Model
We have developed an access control model that is implemented within the infras-
tructure within our architecture. Our access control model is based on a system
where users create permissions that specify who is entitled to obtain their sightings,
under what circumstances these sightings are obtainable, and the maximum accu-
racy of these sightings. Our access control model is then responsible for releasing
users’ sightings in accordance with their permissions. Our architecture assumes that
a user, who is requesting sighting information about another user, communicates di-
rectly with the LBS that provides the relevant service. This LBS then communicates
with the infrastructure, in order to obtain the necessary sightings. Therefore, both
the user and the LBS are seeking sightings from the point-of-view of the infrastruc-
ture. This in effect creates two different subjects in the context of an access control
model.
The main novelty of our access control model is that it enables users to specify
two different types of permission. The first type of permission is used to specify
which users are trusted, and therefore can obtain sighting information, and the
second type of permission is used to specify which LBSs are trusted, and therefore
can obtain sighting information. This has the effect of creating a whitelist for users,
and a separate whitelist for LBSs. The access control model will only allow sightings
to be released if it is presented with both a valid permission specified in terms of
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users, and a valid permission specified in terms of LBSs.
1.5.3 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
We have developed a sighting blurring algorithm that offers users increased privacy
by performing spatial blurring on the location components of their sightings. Instead
of performing temporal blurring, our sighting blurring algorithm will not produce
any new blurred sightings of the user until a specific duration has elapsed. This has
the effect of limiting the frequency with which new sightings can be obtained for a
user, and this frequency is a function of the area of the location component of the
sighting that was produced by the spatial blurring.
There are three advantages of our sighting blurring algorithm compared to the
sighting blurring algorithms presented in the related research. Firstly, our sight-
ing blurring algorithm is designed to be resistant to mathematical attacks based
on frequent sighting requests. Secondly, our sighting blurring algorithm generates
blurred sightings with a consistent sighting accuracy. Thirdly, our sighting blurring
algorithm is only dependent on the sightings of the users that are directly involved
in a current LBS invocation, and it is independent of the sightings of all other users.
1.6 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
• In Chapter 2 we describe the background concepts that are relevant to this
thesis. In particular, we describe the cryptographic concepts and the charg-
ing concepts that we build upon in Chapter 4, and we describe the location
concepts that we build upon in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
• In Chapter 3 we describe research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms
of architectures and protocols, access control models, and sighting blurring
algorithms.
• In Chapter 4 we describe an architecture for users, an infrastructure, and
LBSs, which facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the Internet. We
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also describe a protocol that enables these three entities to achieve three-
party mutual identification and authentication. In particular, this protocol
allows users to simultaneously identify and authenticate themselves to the
infrastructure using one identity, and to the LBS using another identity. This
protocol then guarantees the confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of
all subsequent messages.
• In Chapter 5 we describe an access control model that is implemented within
the infrastructure. This access control model is based on users who are targets
creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and for LBSs that
are proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled
to obtain sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings
are released, and the maximum accuracy of these sightings.
• In Chapter 6 we describe the sighting blurring algorithm that we have de-
veloped, which is implemented within the infrastructure in our architecture.
Our sighting blurring algorithm offers users increased privacy by decreasing
the accuracy of their sightings based on the sighting accuracy allowed by the
access control model described in Chapter 5.
• In Chapter 7 we form our conclusions to this thesis. In particular, we iden-
tify both the major contributions and the minor contributions of this thesis
in terms of our architecture and protocol, our access control model, and our
sighting blurring algorithm. We also identify several areas of the work de-
scribed in this thesis that require further investigation. Finally, we identify
the publications that have arisen as a result of the work described in this thesis.
The work described in this thesis complements the work described in the thesis
written by my colleague Thibault Candebat [17].
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe the background concepts that are relevant to this thesis.
In particular, we describe the cryptographic concepts and the charging concepts that
we build upon in Chapter 4, and we describe the location concepts that we build
upon in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
2.2 Cryptography
In this section we describe the notation, the authentication protocol, and the cryp-
tography system that we build upon in Chapter 4.
2.2.1 Notation
In order to describe the cryptographic techniques and protocols, we introduce the
following notation:
• A and B are two entities who wish to communicate with each other.
• M , M1, M2, . . . Mn are messages. These can be combined together to form
fewer larger messages, and then split apart to reform the original messages.
This can be done in any standard and consistent manner.
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• A → B : M denotes that A prepares the message M and then sends it to B,
and that B receives M and then processes it.
• NA is a nonce generated by A for use by anybody, and NA,B is a nonce gen-
erated by A for use by B.
• TA,B is a timestamp created by A for use by B.
• KA,B is a key used for symmetric cryptography between A and B.
• {M1,M2,M3, . . . Mn}KA,B represents the combined message of M1 to Mn en-
crypted using the symmetric key shared between A and B.
• KA represents the asymmetric key pair belonging to A. This consists of the
public key K+A , and the private key K
−
A .
• {M1,M2,M3, . . . Mn}K+A represents the combined message of M1 to Mn en-
crypted using the public key of A.
• {|M1,M2,M3, . . . Mn|}K−A represents the combined message ofM1 toMn signed
without message recovery using the private key of A.
2.2.2 X.509 Authentication
The X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [46] describes several different authen-
tication protocols. These protocols provide identification and authentication be-
tween two entities, and they also guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and non-
repudiation of messages exchanged. This is achieved using asymmetric cryptography
whereby the entities demonstrate that they possess the correct private keys.
The X.509 authentication protocol that is of most interest to us is the Two-way
Authentication protocol. This is a two step authentication protocol that is based on
A and B both sending a single message to each other. Two-way Authentication is
used to establish the following:
• The identities of both A and B.
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• The first message was actually generated by A, and the second message was
actually generated by B. Therefore, both A and B are authenticated. This
provides mutual authentication.
• The first message was actually intended for B, and the second message was
actually intended for A.
• The integrity of both messages.
• The freshness of both messages.
Two-way Authentication consists of the following steps:
1. A generates NA,B.
2. A sends the following message to B:
TA,B, NA,B, B, {|TA,B, NA,B, B|}K−A
A can include an additional message (M1) that enables B to create a shared
session key that can be used for further communications. In this case A sends
the following message to B:
TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B , {|TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B |}K−A
A can also include an additional message (M2) for B, which B is capable of
verifying. In this case A sends the following message to B:
TA,B, NA,B, B,M2, {|TA,B, NA,B, B,M2|}K−A
A can combine these messages to create a single message for B. In this case
A sends the following message to B:
TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B ,M2, {|TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B ,M2|}K−A
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3. B obtains K+A , and asserts that it is valid based on the certificate belonging
to A. B then verifies the integrity of the signed message.
4. B checks that it is the intended recipient.
5. B checks that TA,B is current.
6. B checks that the message has not been replayed by establishing the uniqueness
of NA,B.
7. If {M1}K+B is present, then B decrypts it, and uses M1 to generate KA,B.
KA,B is then used to symmetrically encrypt and decrypt the remainder of the
session.
8. B generates NB,A.
9. B sends the following message to A:
TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B|}K−B
B can include an additional message (M3) that enables A to create a shared
session key that can be used for further communications. In this case B sends
the following message to A:
TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A , {|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A |}K−B
B can also include an additional message (M4) for A, which A is capable of
verifying. In this case B sends the following message to A:
TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B,M4, {|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B,M4|}K−B
B can combine these messages to create a single message for A. In this case
B sends the following message to A:
TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A ,M4, {|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A ,M4|}K−B
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10. A obtains K+B , and asserts that it is valid based on the certificate belonging
to B. A then verifies the integrity of the signed message.
11. A checks that it is the intended recipient.
12. A checks that TB,A is current.
13. A checks that the message has not been replayed by establishing the uniqueness
of NB,A.
14. A checks that the NA,B that was received is the same as the NA,B that was
sent.
15. If {M3}K+A is present, then A decrypts it, and uses M3 to generate KA,B.
KA,B is then used to symmetrically encrypt and decrypt the remainder of the
session.
Syntactic Abbreviations
We define syntactic abbreviations for each of the variations of the two messages in
this protocol, and we will use these syntactic abbreviations in the remainder of this
thesis. The first message (M) that is sent from A to B is:
M(A,B,K−A ) , TA,B, NA,B, B,
{|TA,B, NA,B, B|}K−A
M(A,B,K−A ,M2) , TA,B, NA,B, B,M2,
{|TA,B, NA,B, B,M2|}K−A
M(A,B,M1,K+B ,K−A ) , TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B ,
{|TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B |}K−A
M(A,B,M1,K+B ,K−A ,M2) , TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B ,M2,
{|TA,B, NA,B, B, {M1}K+B ,M2|}K−A
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The second message (M′), which is sent from B to A in response to M, is:
M′(B,A,K−B ) , TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B,
{|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B|}K−B
M′(B,A,K−B ,M4) , TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B,M4,
{|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B,M4|}K−B
M′(B,A,M3,K+A ,K−B ) , TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A ,
{|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A |}K−B
M′(B,A,M3,K+A ,K−B ,M4) , TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A ,M4,
{|TB,A, NB,A, A,NA,B, {M3}K+A ,M4|}K−B
2.2.3 Mediated Identity Based Cryptography
Candebat has developed a PKI in the context of LBSs that is based on a mediated
identity based cryptography system [17, 18, 19]. The Identity Based Encryption
(IBE) and the Identity Based Signature (IBS) aspects of the mediated identity based
cryptography system are based on work described in [68] and [43]. The mediated
aspects of the mediated identity based cryptography system are based on work
described in [8] and [21]. The mediated identity based cryptography system provides
asymmetric encryption, asymmetric decryption, signing, and verification services.
Its main advantages compared to a traditional cryptography system such as X.509
are:
• The revocation of keys occurs instantly.
• There is no need for entities to retrieve and validate revocation information.
This process is usually costly in terms of both bandwidth and processing power.
• All public keys are strings that represent the names of the entities that own
them. This identity based cryptography simplifies the management of public
keys significantly.
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The architecture of the mediated identity based cryptography system requires
an additional two entities:
• The Security Mediator
The security mediator assists the entities in the system by partially decrypting
ciphertexts and by partially signing plaintexts while the keys remain valid.
The security mediator is not needed for encrypting plaintexts or verifying
signatures. Since the security mediator is required to perform these actions
between the two entities that are communicating with each other, it is designed
to operate as a middleware component.
• The Private Key Generator
The private key generator is responsible for generating each entity’s private
key. This private key consists of two private key shares. The security mediator
uses one of these private key shares, and the entity uses the other private key
share. For example, if the entity’s name is A then its public key is K+A . The
private key generator will generate the private key shares k−A and k
−
A,SM . k
−
A
is then used by A, and k−A,SM is used by the security mediator.
In order to describe the cryptographic processes of the mediated identity based
cryptography system we will extend the notation that was defined previously by
defining P as a plaintext, C as a ciphertext, and S as a signature. The encryption
process, E , consists of a single step involving the public key belonging to A. This
process is defined as:
EK+A (P ) = C
The decryption process, D, consists of two steps. Firstly, the ciphertext is de-
crypted by the security mediator using its private key share for A. Secondly, the
result of this decryption is again decrypted by A using its private key share. This
process is defined as:
Dk−A (Dk−A,SM (C)) = P
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The signing process, S, also consists of two steps. Firstly, the plaintext is par-
tially signed by A using its private key share. Secondly, the signature is completed
by the security mediator using its private key share for A. This process is defined
as:
Sk−A,SM (Sk−A (P )) = S
The verification process, V, consists of evaluating the signature using the public
key belonging to A. This will be true if the signature is valid, or false if the signature
is invalid. This process is defined as:
VK+A (S) = True or False
The mediated identity based cryptography system consists of three keys for each
entity. For example, the keys associated with A are K+A , k
−
A and k
−
A,SM . However,
the cryptographic processes have the same effect as using virtual keys in a traditional
cryptography system. In particular, we introduce the virtual keys K−A and k
+
A . The
keys associated with A are then K+A , K
−
A , k
+
A and k
−
A .
In order to demonstrate the usage of these keys, we will explain the operation
of our mediated identity based cryptography system in situations where A and B
communicate with each other. The encryption and decryption processes are as
follows:
1. A encrypts the message, M , using the public key belonging to B, to produce
{M}K+B .
2. A sends {M}K+B to the security mediator.
3. The security mediator checks the status of the keys belonging to B. If they
have been revoked, then the security mediator generates an appropriate error
message, and the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, the security mediator
partially decrypts {M}K+B using k
−
B,SM . This in effect creates {M}k+B .
4. The security mediator sends {M}k+B to B.
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5. B decrypts {M}k+B using k
−
B to reveal M .
The signing and verification processes are as follows:
1. A partially signs M using k−A to produce {|M |}k−A .
2. A sends {|M |}k−A to the security mediator.
3. The security mediator checks the status of the keys belonging to A. If they
have been revoked, then the security mediator generates an appropriate error
message, and the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, the security mediator
completes the signing of {|M |}k−A using k
−
A,SM . This in effect creates {|M |}K−A .
4. The security mediator sends {|M |}K−A to B.
5. B verifies {|M |}K−A using K
+
A .
It is important to note that neither an entity using the mediated identity based
cryptography system, nor the security mediator, can recover a plaintext from a
ciphertext, or generate a valid signature, on its own.
2.3 Location
In this section we describe the location representation types that we reference in
Chapter 3, the two mathematical location representations that we use in Chapter 6,
and the location protocols that we use in Chapter 4.
2.3.1 Location Representation Types
There are many different location representations that can be used to describe a
single location. However, all of these location representations can be categorised
into three different types of location representations:
• The mathematical location representations are all location representations that
represent locations mathematically. For example, two mathematical location
representations that are based on coordinate reference systems are described
in Section 2.3.2.
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• The political location representations are all location representations that rep-
resent locations using a name that was created by, and is meaningful to, hu-
mans. Many of these political location representations are standardised and
are known publicly, such as street names, region names, or county names.
However, it is possible to create private political location representations. An
example of this occurs when a courier company divides a country into locations
based on their nearest depots. Political representations of locations are often
referred to as symbolic locations.
• The logical location representations are all location representations that rep-
resent locations using the relationship that the location has with a particular
person. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the mathematical location
or political location of a logical location without some additional information,
such as the identity of the person being located. Examples of logical represen-
tations of locations are “Home” and “Work”.
Each of these types of location representations is commonly used in everyday
circumstances.
2.3.2 Mathematical Location Representations
There are two mathematical location representations that are relevant to the work
described in this thesis, and both of these mathematical location representations are
based on coordinate reference systems.
WGS 84
Coordinate reference systems provide a means of describing a location in relation
to the Earth [58]. For example, once such coordinate reference system describes
locations in terms of their latitude, longitude, and altitude coordinates. The latitude
is the angle that is created between the location and the plain that the equator lies
on, the longitude is the angle that is created between the location and the plain that
the Greenwich Meridian lies on, and the altitude is the height above sea level. This
concept is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Example Coordinate Reference System
Regardless of which coordinate reference system is used, there are still problems
relating the coordinate reference system to the Earth. For example, the sea level
used to define altitude is constantly changing. In order to relate the coordinate
reference system to the Earth, the shape of the Earth is modelled mathematically
using an ellipsoid.
Therefore, to fully describe a location on, or near, the surface of the Earth the
coordinates of the location, as well as the ellipsoid modelling the Earth, are needed.
Together these two pieces of information are known as a geodetic datum.
The most relevant geodetic datum to the work described in this thesis is the WGS
84 geodetic datum [54]. This was originally developed by the American Department
of Defence with the design goal of providing a fairly high level of precision everywhere
in the world, and it is the geodetic datum that is used by GPS.
Irish Grid
The Irish Grid is a coordinate reference system that is based on an imaginary surface
that is centred over the centre of Ireland [57]. However, in order to keep the scales
positive its true origin is transposed to a false origin southwest of Ireland. Locations
in Ireland are then described in terms of their north and east distances from the
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Figure 2.2: The Irish Grid (Map c© Google Maps)
origin in metres. These distances are known as Northings and Eastings. The concept
of the Irish Grid is shown in Figure 2.2.
2.3.3 Location Protocols
There are several different Internet based protocols that enable third parties to ob-
tain location information about users’ mobile devices from network operators. These
protocols enable third parties to obtain this location information in a consistent man-
ner regardless of the types of users’ mobile devices, and the positioning technology
used to locate them. The most popular of these protocols provide similar services,
and there are no significant differences between them.
Mobile Location Protocol
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) is a consortium of companies, whose main aim is
to develop and promote open standards within the mobile phone industry [55]. They
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developed a standard, known as the Mobile Location Protocol (MLP), for exchanging
location information about users [56]. The MLP consists of several services, and each
service consists of a number of messages.
The most relevant service to the work described in this thesis is the Standard
Location Immediate Service. This service is used to immediately obtain the location
of one of more mobile devices. The third party initiates this service by sending
a Standard Location Immediate Request message to the network operator, and the
network operator returns a Standard Location Immediate Answer message, which
contains the locations of all the requested mobile devices, to the third party.
Parlay
The Parlay Group is a consortium of companies, whose main aim is to develop and
promote open standards within the telecommunications industry [60]. Its members
come from many different areas, such as equipment manufacturers, network opera-
tors, and software developers. It focuses on standards that enable third parties to
access and use network operators’ resources in a secure, measurable, and chargeable
manner. For example, these resources can be related to call control, SMS, MMS,
charging, and location. Using these standards provides benefits to all parties in-
volved. Equipment manufacturers are more likely to sell their hardware, because it
supports an open standard. Network operators can generate extra revenues from
their existing hardware. Software developers can develop applications regardless of
the underlying hardware. Finally, users experience a better service because there
are more applications available to them.
The Parlay Group has developed an open API called the Parlay API, and this
API provides several methods that allow third parties to obtain location information
about users’ mobile devices [62].
However, in recent years the web services model has experienced widespread
adoption. In order to benefit from this, the Parley Group developed a new set of
standards that enable third parties to access and use the network resources using the
web services model. These new standards are known as the Parlay X Web Services,
and they are the most relevant standards to the work described in this thesis.
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Figure 2.3: Traditional Settlement Model
The TerminalLocation service enables third parties to immediately obtain lo-
cation information about users’ mobile devices from network operators [64]. In
particular, this service contains a getLocation method that is used to obtain the
location of a single mobile device, and a getLocationForGroup method that is used
to obtain the locations of a group of mobile devices.
2.4 Charging
In this section we describe the revenue sharing settlement model and charging pro-
tocols that we build upon in Chapter 4.
2.4.1 Revenue Sharing Settlement Model
Settlement is the process where one entity makes a payment to another entity for the
charges resulting from the provision of a service. In the traditional settlement model,
users had completely separate settlement arrangements with network operators and
service providers, as shown in Figure 2.3.
However, there are several disadvantages with this approach. The user must
establish a new settlement arrangement with every new service provider whose ser-
25
Figure 2.4: Revenue Sharing Settlement Model
vices he/she wishes to use, and this normally involves a significant amount of effort.
A consequence of these settlement arrangements is that it is impossible for the user
to remain anonymous to the service provider. Finally, as more users start using ser-
vices, and more service providers become available, the total number of settlement
arrangements between users and service providers grows rapidly.
An alternative settlement model, which overcomes these disadvantages, is the
revenue sharing settlement model. This settlement model involves one party col-
lecting revenue from the user, and sharing it with the other parties with which the
user interacts, as shown in Figure 2.4. Normally, the parties that share revenue are
offering services at different levels in the value chain. The result of only one party
collecting revenue from the user is that he/she receives a single bill covering all the
charges that have been incurred, regardless of how many parties were involved in
providing the service. This is often referred to as one stop billing.
The relationship between the network operators and the service providers makes
them very good candidates for using the revenue sharing settlement model. There
are several reasons for this:
• The network operators already have established charging processes. Therefore,
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they can extend these existing charging processes to support the new charging
requirements of the service providers.
• The network operators already have established settlement arrangements with
their customers. Therefore, no additional settlement arrangements need to be
established in order to collect extra revenues from these users.
• Making payments is effortless from the users’ points of view. This greatly
increases the likelihood of users paying for using services.
This settlement model is already widely used within the telecommunications in-
dustry. A popular example of its use occurs between network operators and service
providers that provide premium rate services such as technical support, competi-
tions, and adult services.
2.4.2 Charging Protocols
There are several different Internet based protocols that enable third parties to ex-
change charging information, which relates to users, with network operators. There-
fore, these protocols are suitable for implementing a revenue sharing settlement
model. Third parties can use these protocols to exchange charging information in a
consistent manner regardless of the types of commercial relationships that the users
have with the network operators.
Parlay
The most relevant charging protocol to the work described in this thesis is the
charging protocol developed by the Parlay Group. The Parlay API enables third
parties to use many different charging services [61]. However, the Parlay X Web
Services for charging are more relevant to the work described in this thesis [63].
The Amount Charging service is used to immediately apply charging details,
which are expressed in monetary terms, to a user’s account. The most relevant meth-
ods in this service are the chargeAmount method and the refundAmount method.
Both of these methods require the user’s identity, the amount to charge or refund,
and a description of the charge or refund.
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The Volume Charging service is used to immediately apply charging details,
which are expressed in terms of a volume of some non-monetary unit, to a user’s
account. The most relevant methods are the chargeVolume method and the refund-
Volume method. Both of these methods require the user’s identity, the volume to
charge or refund, and a description of the charge or refund. There is also a getA-
mount method that is used to get the monetary value of a particular volume of some
non-monetary unit for a particular user.
The Reserve Amount Charging service is used to do reservation charging in mon-
etary terms. The reserveAmount method is used to reserve an amount of money in
the user’s account for use with this service. This method requires the user’s identity,
the amount to reserve, and a description of the reservation. The reserveAddition-
alAmount method is used to either increase or decrease an existing reservation.
The chargeReservation method is used to apply the charge to the user’s account.
Finally, the releaseReservation method is used when the user will not incur any
further charges for this service.
The Reserve Volume Charging service is used to do reservation charging in terms
of a volume of some non-monetary unit. The reserveVolume method is used to re-
serve a charge, which is expressed as a volume of some non-monetary unit, in the
user’s account for use with this service. This method requires the user’s identity,
the amount to reserve, and a description of the reservation. The reserveAddition-
alVolume method is used to either increase or decrease an existing reservation. The
chargeReservation method is used to apply the charge to the user’s account. Fi-
nally, the releaseReservation method is used when the user will not incur any further
charges for this service. There is also a getAmount method that is used to get the
monetary value of a particular volume of some non-monetary unit for a particular
user.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we described the background concepts that are relevant to this thesis.
In particular, we described the cryptographic concepts and the charging concepts
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that we build upon in Chapter 4, and we described the location concepts that we
build upon in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
Related Research
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms of
architectures and protocols, access control models, and sighting blurring algorithms.
3.2 Architectures and Protocols
In this section we describe research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms of
architectures and protocols.
3.2.1 Transcoding Middleware Architecture
The use of an architecture that contains a middleware entity between mobile devices
and web servers has been proposed for improving web browsing. In particular, HTTP
proxy servers [33] can be used to modify content in real-time for mobile devices. This
process is known as transcoding. The architecture and message flow for transcoding
services are shown in Figure 3.1.
The message flow for transcoding services consists of the following four steps:
1. The user enters the address of a web server into the web browser on his/her
mobile device. The mobile device sends this address to the transcoding proxy
server.
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Figure 3.1: Transcoding Architecture and Message Flow
2. The transcoding proxy server contacts the web server, and requests the web
content that was specified by the user.
3. The web server returns the specified web content to the transcoding proxy
server.
4. The transcoding proxy server modifies the web content in some manner. The
modified web content is then returned to the user’s mobile device and displayed
using his/her web browser.
There has been considerable research into different methods of modifying the
web content as it passes through the transcoding proxy server. The authors of [15]
propose a transcoding proxy server that improves the web browsing experience for
the user by reducing latency. It does this by reducing the amount of data that the
user’s mobile device must send and receive. For example, the transcoding proxy
server validates web server addresses, and redirects requests based on network load.
It also performs additional processing such as prefetching web content in anticipation
of the user requesting it. The transcoding proxy server is also capable of modifying
the web content to create additional application value. For example, it can replace
post codes within the web content with town names or city names.
A transcoding proxy server is proposed in [14] to facilitate web browsing using
mobile devices and wireless networks. The transcoding proxy server can use one
protocol to communicate with the mobile device, and a different protocol to com-
municate with the web server. This can facilitate more efficient network usage, and
faster response times. The transcoding proxy server can filter and modify the HTML
[70] content. For example, references to media types and scripting languages that
are not supported by the mobile device can be removed. Images can be modified to
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suit the mobile device’s capabilities by down-scaling them, converting them to other
file formats, and reducing their colour depth.
The authors of [51] propose a transcoding proxy server that modifies the web con-
tent based on community preferences. The idea behind this is that the transcoding
proxy server learns about a user’s interests based on his/her web browsing activities.
The transcoding proxy server then tries to categorise the user based on a community
of users with similar interests. When the user requests web content, the transcoding
proxy server modifies the web content based on the community’s interest in that
web content. The transcoding proxy server contains a mechanism for allowing users
to specify certain preferences, and it is always possible for the user to retrieve the
original high quality content with some additional clicks.
3.2.2 LBS Middleware Architecture
The use of an architecture that contains a middleware entity has also been proposed
many times in the context of LBSs.
The developers of the GUIDE project use several middleware entities between
the user’s mobile device and the web server [22]. These middleware entities place
contextual information, such as location information, into web pages without the
web servers needing to process any contextual information. To achieve this, several
GUIDE tags are proposed. These tags have a similar structure to normal HTML
tags, but represent contextual information. For example, there is a GUIDE tag that
represents the user’s current location. The web content developers can use these
GUIDE tags within their HTML documents. When a user wishes to view a new web
page his/her mobile device’s web browser sends a request to the middleware, which in
turn retrieves the web content from the relevant web server. The middleware then
replaces all of the GUIDE tags with normal HTML that represents the contextual
information, such as the user’s current location. This new web content is then
returned to the user’s mobile device’s web browser.
Brunato and Battiti propose a location based recommendation system, known
as PILGRIM, which is based on a middleware entity [16]. This recommendation
system tailors search results based on the user’s current location, and the search
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results are ranked using the observations of previous users. The information about
the user’s web browsing activity is captured using a modified HTTP proxy server,
and this information is then used as an input into the recommendation system.
Gruteser and Grunwald propose a middleware entity called a location server in
[37]. This middleware entity operates between the user’s mobile device and the LBS.
It is responsible for performing sighting blurring, and the sighting blurring algorithm
is described in Section 3.4.4. Bellavista, Corradi, and Giannelli also propose a
middleware entity for performing sighting blurring [10]. Their approach is described
in Section 3.4.3.
Hengartner describes a middleware entity that operates between the user’s mobile
device and the LBS in [40]. Hengartner assumes that the user trusts the middleware
entity, and that the user does not trust the LBS with his/her sightings. Therefore,
private information retrieval is used by a trusted computing module within the LBS
to ensure that it never has access to the user’s sightings.
Myles, Friday, and Davies propose a middleware entity that operates between
the user’s mobile device and the LBS [52]. This middleware entity is responsible
for releasing users’ sightings to LBSs in accordance with the users’ privacy policies.
These privacy policies are specified using a modified version of an existing standard
for privacy policies, called the Platform for Privacy Preferences [71]. This standard
is designed to specify privacy policies in the context of websites, and it specifies
what information websites will collect from users, and how this information will be
used. The standard does not cover related issues, such as the secure transfer of the
information, or the policy enforcement.
3.2.3 Identification and Authentication Protocols
Identification and authentication play a crucial role in providing users with increased
security in the context of LBSs, and there are several research efforts in this area.
Perhaps the simplest approach is to remove all identification information from mes-
sages that are exchanged with LBSs. The advantage of this approach where identifi-
cation information is removed is that it offers the user very strong privacy. However,
this is achieved by reducing the usefulness of certain LBSs that require some form
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of persistent identification.
Therefore, another popular approach is to use temporary pseudonyms that change
frequently, instead of using real identities. For example, the authors of [47] propose
using this approach in the context of LBSs. In particular, their approach is designed
for use within mobile phone networks.
The authors of [67] propose a system where sightings are recorded as tuples
containing the location of a user, the time when he/she was located, and a unique
random number that can be changed at any stage by the user. The user allows
an LBS to start accessing his/her location information by providing the LBS with
his/her unique random number. The user stops the LBS from accessing his/her
location information by changing his/her unique random number. Therefore, these
random numbers are in effect pseudonyms.
Finally, Beresford and Stajano propose using a middleware server between the
user’s mobile device and the LBS [11, 12]. This middleware server is responsible
for removing information about the user’s real identity. It is also inserts a ran-
dom pseudonym on behalf of the user, and it can change this random pseudonym
frequently. This ability is used to provide a form of sighting blurring, and this is
described in Section 3.4.1.
In all of these examples the random pseudonyms change very frequently in order
to prevent their owners being identified. Therefore, users are anonymous when they
invoke LBSs, and hence there is no need for identification or authentication.
Escudero-Pascual and Maguire propose using a middleware entity to provide the
user with increased privacy by hiding both the location of his/her mobile device,
and his/her identity, from the LBS [30]. Cryptographic techniques are used to
mutually identify and authenticate the entities. All subsequent messages can then
be encrypted and signed. The main disadvantage of this proposal is that there
is no support for users having multiple pseudonyms. Furthermore, all entities are
identified and authenticated with each other in a pair-wise manner.
Hauser and Kabatnik propose an architecture where each request for sightings
is created by either a user or an LBS [39]. These sighting requests are then sent
to a server that is capable of sighting the users. Therefore, there are only ever two
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entities participating in any sighting request (the user or the LBS and the server),
and these two entities are mutually identified and authenticated to each other using
cryptographic techniques. Hauser and Kabatnik propose using an identity based
cryptography system, which enables users to create and sign authorisation certifi-
cates. The user or LBS who is requesting the sightings creates and signs a sighting
request containing the identity of the user to be sighted, and the relevant authorisa-
tion certificate. The user whose sighting is requested is identified using a pseudonym.
However, since these users are not participating in the sighting request protocol,
there is no need for them to be able to perform cryptographic operations using their
pseudonyms.
3.2.4 Conclusions
In this section we described research efforts based on transcoding proxy servers de-
signed for use with mobile devices, as well as research efforts in the context of LBSs.
All of these research efforts are based on an architecture that uses a middleware
entity. Therefore, an architecture based on a middleware entity is a suitable archi-
tecture for facilitating the operation of LBSs over the Internet. Furthermore, such
a middleware entity is suitable for providing common functionality regarding the
users’ identity information and sighting information.
We also described research efforts that provide identification and authentica-
tion in the context of LBSs. Some of these research efforts enable users to access
LBSs anonymously or using temporary pseudonyms, and hence there is no need for
identification or authentication. These research efforts enable users to reduce the
amount of trust that they must place in LBSs, albeit at the expense of reducing the
usefulness of certain LBSs that require some form of persistent identification.
We then described research efforts that enable users to have persistent pseudonyms.
However, none of these research efforts enable users to perform cryptographic oper-
ations using their pseudonyms. Furthermore, many of the research efforts described
in this section are based on architectures consisting of users, LBSs, and middleware
entities. However, none of these research efforts propose any three-party identifica-
tion and authentication protocols.
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In Section 4.12 we will compare the related research described in this section
with our architecture and protocol.
3.3 Access Control Models
In this section we describe research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms of access
control models.
3.3.1 Single Subject Centralised Access Control Models
The authors of [45] propose a centralised access control model, which consists of
permissions that incorporate contextual information about both the user who is
the subject and the user who is the object. Therefore, their access control model
assumes that there will only be one subject in each request for a user’s sightings.
Users create their own contexts based on their current contextual information. For
example, a user might create a Work context to be used during the working hours
of the weekdays, and a Shopping context to be used at the weekends if the user is in
a shopping area of the city. Users then create permissions, which specify the users
who are subjects that can request their sightings, based on these contexts. Thus,
the permissions used by the access control model to determine the rights of a user
who is a subject will vary automatically depending on the context of the user who
is the object of the permissions. Users manage their contexts and permissions using
a web-based interface.
Ray and Kumar propose extending an access control model based on Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) so that it includes location information [66]. They have
designed their access control model primarily for use by military applications. Their
access control model requires that all locations are part of a hierarchy of political
locations (see Section 2.3.1), and every location is associated with a security level.
Their access control model is used to control which users, as subjects, have privileges
to access which resources, as objects, based on the locations of both the users and
the resources.
Atluri and Shin present an access control model for combining users’ sightings
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with their profiles and permissions [6, 7]. Their access control model is based on a
traditional access control model that assumes that there will only be one user who
is a subject in each request for a user’s sightings. However, the main focus of this
research effort is to develop a data structure to efficiently manage users’ sightings,
profiles, and permissions. In particular, this tree based data structure is capable of
storing and querying all past, present, and future sightings.
Finally, the authors of [4] propose modifications to a traditional access control
model that enable its policies to contain conditions that are expressed in terms of
the sighting information of the user who is the subject. In order to achieve this,
the authors propose several location based predicates that can be used within the
policies. These location based predicates can be used to determine if the user who is
the subject is in a certain area, if he/she is within a certain distance range of another
user or an area, if his/her speed is within a certain speed range, and if he/she is
in the same area as a certain range of other users. Each of these location based
predicates returns a boolean result and confidence value for this result.
3.3.2 Single Subject Distributed Access Control Models
Hauser and Kabatnik consider that there will be too many users of LBSs for a
centralised access control model to be successful [39]. Therefore, they propose a
distributed access control model that is based on public key cryptography and cer-
tificates. Their access control model uses identity based cryptography where public
keys are used to identify the users who own them. Users create authorisation certifi-
cates that contain both the identity of the user or LBS with which they want to share
their sightings and the associated permission. Users then sign these authorisation
certificates, and distribute them to the users and LBSs that are named within them.
When a user or LBS wants to sight a user, he/she/it creates a sighting request that
contains both the identity of the user to be sighted and the relevant authorisation
certificate. This sighting request is then sent to a server that is capable of sighting
users.
Zhong, Goldberg, and Hengartner have developed three different protocols to
control the release of information about users’ sightings [73]. In particular, these
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three protocols allow a user to obtain information about sightings of another user
if, and only if, both users are in close proximity to each other. The quantification of
close proximity is agreed by both users when they invoke the protocol. Therefore,
these three protocols have the effect of enforcing proximity based permissions within
an access control model. All three protocols are based on a single user requesting
information about the sightings of another single user, and a distributed architecture
is used to ensure that no third parties have access to users’ sightings. All three
protocols are based on public key cryptography. The main differences between the
three protocols are the number of message exchanges that they require, and the
amount of sighting information that is revealed to the users. For example, one of
the protocols enables both users to obtain only the distance between them if they
are in close proximity to each other, whereas another of the protocols enables both
users to obtain a sighting of the other user if they are in close proximity to each
other.
3.3.3 Dual Subject Centralised Access Control Models
Leonhardt and Magee propose a centralised access control model that supports per-
missions containing more than one subject [50]. Each permission in this access
control model is specified in terms of three parameters. The first parameter speci-
fies the subject or subjects who can use the permission. If more than one subject is
specified then the permission can only be used by all of the specified subjects simul-
taneously. These subjects can be either users or locations. The second parameter
specifies the action that the permission entitles the subject or subjects to perform.
The most relevant actions are the ability to obtain sightings of another user or users,
and the ability to test for the presence of a user or users in a location or locations.
The third parameter specifies the object or objects that the permission covers. If
more than one object is specified then the action must be applied to all of these
objects. These objects can be either users or locations. An example of a permission
in this access control model that contains two subjects is a permission that entitles
Stefano to obtain sightings of Carlotta if he is using the FriendFinder LBS. This is
specified as a permission with two subjects (Stefano and FriendFinder), an action
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to sight, and a single object (Carlotta). An example of a permission in this access
control model that contains two objects is a permission that entitles Stefano to ob-
tain sightings of Carlotta if she is in UCD. This is specified as a permission with a
single subject (Stefano), an action to sight, and two objects (Carlotta and UCD).
Hengartner and Steenkiste propose an architecture for an access control model
with two types of queries [41, 42]. The first type of query is called a user query,
and this is used to obtain a user’s sightings. The second type of query is called a
room query, and this is used to determine which users are at a particular location.
There are two types of corresponding permissions. The first type of permission is a
user permission, and this specifies who is allowed to obtain sightings of a particular
user. The second type of permission is a room permission, and this specifies who
is allowed to obtain sightings of users who are in a particular location. Both of
these permissions can contain restrictions that are specified in terms of specific users,
locations, and times. The concept of service trust is then introduced in order to allow
users to specify which services they trust with their sightings. These trusted services
are then allowed to receive sightings on behalf of users who are the subjects of the
permissions. The trusted services always inherit the permissions of the users who are
the subjects of these permissions. Both the users and the trusted services are capable
of delegating their rights to other users and services to form delegation chains.
Public key cryptography and certificates are used to implement these permissions
and trusts. Although this access control model is implemented as a centralised access
control model, the use of public key cryptography and certificates makes this access
control model suitable for implementing as a dual subject distributed access control
model.
3.3.4 Conclusions
In this section we described access control model research efforts in the context
of LBSs. Both the single subject centralised access control models and the single
subject distributed access control models assume that there will be only one subject
involved in each request for a user’s sightings. Therefore, these single subject access
control models are not adequate for use in circumstances where sighting requests
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can originate from users, LBSs, or combinations of both users and LBSs. The dual
subject centralised access control models are designed to address this inadequacy.
However, none of theses access control models recognise users and LBSs as distinct,
but equally important, subjects.
Both the single subject centralised access control models and the dual subject
centralised access control models require another entity that is responsible for storing
and managing permissions. The main advantage of this approach is that the users
and LBSs do not need to store and manage permissions. However, this approach
relies on a single entity, and it may not be scalable. In contrast, the single subject
distributed access control models do not require the assistance of another entity to
store and manage permissions. The main advantage of this approach is that there is
no need to centrally store and manage permissions. This facilitates both redundancy
and scalability. The most significant disadvantage of this approach is that users and
LBSs must store and manage the permissions. Finally, we are not aware of any dual
subject distributed access control models.
In Section 5.6 we will compare the related research described in this section with
our access control model and its requirements, which are described in Section 5.2.
3.4 Sighting Blurring Algorithms
In this section we describe research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms of
sighting blurring algorithms.
3.4.1 Anonymity Based Blurring Algorithms
Beresford and Stajano propose an approach for protecting users’ location infor-
mation based on a technique used in anonymous communications [11, 12]. This
approach works in scenarios where the user is identified using a random pseudonym,
and this pseudonym changes regularly.
The basic idea is that special regions called mix zones are created. Normally
users can be located very accurately. However, when they enter a mix zone their
locations are reported as being in the mix zone, without specifying the exact location.
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Figure 3.2: Mix Zone Example
Whenever the user enters a mix zone his/her pseudonym is changed. By ensuring
that there are always at least two users in the mix zone, it is not possible to link the
old pseudonym and the new pseudonym with certainty, and hence the user cannot
be identified and tracked. The exact number of users that must be present in the
mix zone is known as the anonymity set size.
An example of the mix zone concept is shown in Figure 3.2. The external view
of the mix zone is shown in Figure 3.2 (a). It is not possible to link the four paths
that are entering the mix zone and the four paths that are exiting the mix zone with
certainty. The internal view of the mix zone with internal paths is shown in Figure
3.2 (b).
There are two significant disadvantages associated with this approach. Firstly,
it is not possible for users to have persistent identifications. Secondly, the accuracy
of the users’ sightings varies depending on their locations.
3.4.2 Probability Based Blurring Algorithms
Several authors have proposed techniques that blur a user’s sightings by introducing
an element of uncertainty to his/her blurred sightings, and this uncertainty can be
quantified as a probability.
Duckham and Kulik propose a sighting blurring algorithm that creates additional
locations where the user might be located, such that the probability of the user being
located in any of these additional locations is the same as the probability that the
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Figure 3.3: Probability Based Location Blurring Algorithms
user is in the location in which he/she is really located [26].
The authors of [5] propose three different sighting blurring algorithms that are
based on probabilities. All three of these algorithms assume that the user is in a
circular location. The first algorithm increases the radius of the circle containing
the user, as shown in Figure 3.3 (a). The second algorithm shifts the centre of the
circle containing the user, as shown in Figure 3.3 (b). The third algorithm reduces
the radius of the circle containing the user, as shown in Figure 3.3 (c). All three of
these algorithms can be combined together to offer the user increased privacy. The
authors describe a way of enabling users to specify their privacy in terms of the first
algorithm, even though the specified privacy can be achieved using a combination
of all three algorithms.
Finally, the authors of [20] propose an algorithm that can generate a list of users
who might be in or near a specific location, along with the probability that these
users really are in or near this location.
The disadvantage of all probability based blurring algorithms is that they do not
produce blurred sightings that are guaranteed to contain the user.
3.4.3 Political Location Blurring Algorithms
Political location blurring algorithms work by dividing a location into a hierarchy
of political locations (see Section 2.3.1). For example, consider the hierarchy shown
in Figure 3.4 where University is composed of several buildings including the Com-
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Figure 3.4: Political Location Hierarchy
puting Building, and the Computing Building is composed of three floors, and the
First Floor is composed of two rooms. The accuracy of a location can be blurred by
choosing one of its ancestors in the hierarchy. In the example, the location L1.01 can
be blurred by using First Floor or Computing Building depending on the required
level of blurring.
Several authors have already proposed approaches that use political location
blurring. Bellavista, Corradi, and Giannelli have developed a middleware proxy
that performs location blurring of political locations in the context of Wi-Fi networks
[10]. The access control model developed by Leonhardt and Magee supports location
blurring of political locations [50]. Narayanan groups similar political locations,
which are referred to as states, together to create realms [53]. In our example,
Library, Computer Building, Bank, and Engineering Building are all states within
the realm representing buildings in University. The accuracy of any location can
then be blurred by choosing the appropriate realm.
The main disadvantage of using algorithms that blur political locations is that
there is no guarantee of the accuracy of any blurred locations. For example, the Bank
location in University is significantly smaller than the Library location. Also, it
could be difficult to create a consistent location hierarchy that covers large locations
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due to the effort involved, and the different types of underlying political locations.
3.4.4 Spatial and Temporal Blurring Algorithms
Spatial blurring algorithms work by increasing the spatial aspects of sightings, and
temporal blurring algorithms work by increasing the temporal aspects of sightings.
Both of these algorithms are often used together, since they both modify the sight-
ings in a complimentary manner.
Gruteser and Grunwald propose a middleware entity for performing sighting
blurring [37]. In this approach the users’ sighting are described using the tuple
〈(x1, x2), (y1, y2), (t1, t2)〉, where 〈(x1, x2), (y1, y2)〉 represents the rectangle contain-
ing the user, and (t1, t2) represents the time interval when the user was within the
rectangle. The authors propose a concept called k-anonymity, which is used to de-
scribe a user that is only identifiable as being one of k users. For example, if k = 10,
then a user’s sighting will always be reported as being the same as nine other users.
Their cloaking algorithm can use a mix of spatial blurring and temporal blurring in
order to achieve the k-anonymity. If the user is in a very densely populated area,
then |x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|, and |t1 − t2| can become very small. However, when the
user is in a very sparsely populated area then |x1 − x2|, |y1 − y2|, and |t1 − t2| can
become very large.
The authors extend their approach in [36] by introducing two concepts that
prevent an attacker from tracking a user. The first concept is called minutiae sup-
pression, and this blocks the release of a user’s sightings when he/she is in a location
that would divulge his/her identity. The second concept is called path segmentation,
and this divides a user’s path into several smaller paths that cannot be attributed to
the same user because his/her pseudonym changes when one path ends and another
begins. Hoh and Gruteser extend the concept of path segmentation with a concept
called path perturbation, which intentionally modifies users sightings so that their
paths are briefly indistinguishable from each other [44].
Gruteser and Liu extend the concepts of k-anonymity and minutiae suppression
in [38] by developing three algorithms that limit the circumstances in which sightings
of users are released. These algorithms require that all locations that can contain
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users be classified as either sensitive or insensitive. The base algorithm is a direct
application of minutiae suppression that only releases sightings of a user if he/she
is in an insensitive area. The bounded-rate algorithm extends the base algorithm
by introducing a threshold for releasing new sightings of a user when he/she is in
an insensitive area. Finally, the k-area algorithm extends the base algorithm by
only releasing new sightings of a user in an insensitive area if these sightings do not
enable an attacker to determine which of k sensitive areas the user has visited.
Gedik and Liu extend k-anonymity in [34] by allowing each user to specify
his/her own k-anonymity. Furthermore, they allow each user to specify the maxi-
mum amount that his/her spatial or temporal data will be blurred.
The main disadvantage of using blurring algorithms based on k-anonymity is
that these algorithms require knowledge of current sightings of the user who is
being located and every other user in his/her vicinity, in order to determine which
users are the other k − 1 users. Another disadvantage of these blurring algorithms
is that the sighting accuracy of the users’ sightings can change dramatically due the
proximity of other users.
3.4.5 Frequency Based Blurring Algorithms
Frequency based blurring algorithms are sighting blurring algorithms that control
the frequency with which users’ sightings are released. Thus, an attacker cannot gain
any additional information by invoking the sighting blurring algorithm frequently.
The only frequency based blurring algorithm which we are aware of is the algo-
rithm developed by Candebat [17]. In this algorithm a user’s sightings are spatially
blurred by increasing their location components in accordance with the user’s privacy
preferences. However, the algorithm will only release fresh sightings of a user if the
user could be located anywhere within the released location with equal probability.
This probability is based on calculating the maximum distance the user could have
travelled since the last sighting of him/her, based on his/her current instantaneous
speed.
One of the consequences of this algorithm is that it requires fresh input sightings
of the user to calculate his/her current instantaneous speed, but the blurred sightings
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that are created using these fresh input sightings might never be released by the
algorithm. A disadvantage of this algorithm is that it is possible for an attacker to
determine the user’s current instantaneous speed based on the frequency with which
sightings are released. Also, the algorithm will only ever release a single sighting
for each blurred location, regardless of how long the user stays in that location.
Therefore, these sightings might not be fresh.
3.4.6 Conclusions
In this section we described sighting blurring algorithm research efforts in the context
of LBSs. Although these research efforts have many merits, they also have significant
shortcomings. Some of the sighting blurring algorithms described in this section offer
users increased privacy by making their sightings or paths anonymous. Although
this is acceptable for some LBSs, there will be many other LBSs that may require
some form of persistent identification for users.
Several of the sighting blurring algorithms produce blurred sightings with accu-
racies that vary depending on the circumstances of the invocation. It is possible
that this inconsistency will hinder the creation of consistent LBSs, and this in turn
will discourage the usage of these LBSs by users. Similarly, it is possible that that
the probability based blurring algorithms will cause LBSs to provide services that
are perceived to be inaccurate or misleading by users, and this will also discourage
their usage.
The k-anonymity blurring algorithms require knowledge of current sightings of
many users. However, this sighting knowledge may not be available due to limita-
tions of the underlying positioning technology, the privacy preferences of the users
who are not involved in the current invocation of the LBS, or the charges incurred
for obtaining these sightings. Furthermore, the k-anonymity blurring algorithms
are only capable of hiding a user amongst k − 1 other users of the algorithm. This
would cause these algorithms to produce very blurred sightings if the take-up of the
algorithm is low.
The frequency based blurring algorithm developed by Candebat is the most rele-
vant to our sighting blurring algorithm. However, the charges incurred for obtaining
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the sightings needed to calculate the users’ current instantaneous speeds may cause
this algorithm to be cost prohibitive.
In Section 6.5.3 we will compare the related research described in this section
with our sighting blurring algorithm and its requirements, which are described in
Section 6.3.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we described research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms of
architectures and protocols, access control models, and sighting blurring algorithms.
Although these research efforts have many merits, they also have significant short-
comings. In the following three chapters we describe how we have addressed these
shortcomings by developing our own architecture and protocol, access control model,
and sighting blurring algorithm.
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Chapter 4
Architecture and Protocol
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we describe an architecture for users, an infrastructure, and LBSs,
which facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the Internet. We also describe a
protocol that enables these three entities to achieve three-party mutual identifica-
tion and authentication. In particular, this protocol allows users to simultaneously
identify and authenticate themselves to the infrastructure using one identity, and to
the LBS using another identity. This protocol then guarantees the confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages.
4.2 Entities
In this section we describe the five entities within our architecture.
4.2.1 Locatables
A locatable entity is a mobile device that can be located. This may be because it
contains either a satellite based positioning technology or a mobile phone network
based positioning technology.
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4.2.2 Network Operators
A network operator manages and maintains a network of locatables, and therefore it
is capable of producing sightings of each locatable. The network operator provides
an interface that enables other entities to obtain these sightings (see Section 2.3.3),
albeit for a charge. Access to this interface is only provided to a limited number of
entities, and the approval procedure is normally slow and requires significant human
intervention.
The network operator supports a revenue sharing model (see Section 2.4.1), and
it provides an interface that enables other entities to exchange charging details (see
Section 2.4.2). Again, access to this interface is only provided to a limited number of
entities, and the approval procedure is normally slow and requires significant human
intervention.
The most common form of network operator in the context of publicly accessible
LBSs is a mobile phone network operator.
4.2.3 LBSs
An LBS is a service that is operated by a party who is normally independent of the
network operator.
4.2.4 The Infrastructure
The infrastructure entity is responsible for providing all of the common functional-
ity that is required by LBSs. This factoring-out of the common functionality means
that the developers of LBSs do not need to repeatedly re-implement similar func-
tionality. The main focus of this functionality is on managing the users’ identity
and sighting information. In particular, the infrastructure is responsible for hosting
an implementation of the access control model described in Chapter 5, and it is also
responsible for performing sighting blurring as described in Chapter 6.
The infrastructure is capable of using the APIs that are supported by the network
operators in order to obtain sightings of users, as well as to exchange charging details
regarding the users.
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4.2.5 Users
A user is an entity that subscribes to an infrastructure. This enables him/her to
invoke LBSs using either his/her mobile device or a desktop computer. Users own
locatables, and therefore we refer to locating users rather than locating locatables.
A user invokes an LBS by sending a request to it. The LBS then contacts
the infrastructure and obtains the location information that it needs to provide
the service to the user. The LBS normally processes this information further by
applying application functionality and presentation functionality, and it then sends
the results back to the user. For example, the LBS might generate maps containing
the sightings, or provide directions to a location.
4.3 Architecture
The infrastructure is designed to operate as a middleware entity, whereby all com-
munications between the users and the LBSs go via the infrastructure. However,
users are unaware of this, because the infrastructure is a transparent middleware.
Therefore, when a user establishes a connection with an LBS it is actually a virtual
connection. In reality, the user has established a logical connection to the infras-
tructure, and the infrastructure has established a logical connection to the LBS.
The infrastructure can behave as a passive middleware that does not modify the
message sequences or message contents, or it can behave as an active middleware
that modifies either the message sequences or message contents. An overview of this
architecture containing these entities is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.4 Naming
Every user within our architecture is assigned a unique account name when he/she
first registers with the infrastructure, and this account name is then used to identify
the user to the infrastructure. Account names are only used between the user and
the infrastructure, and inside the infrastructure. They consist of a unique value,
and they can be linked to the user’s personal details, and in particular, to details of
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Figure 4.1: Architectural Diagram Showing Entities and Roles (in Parentheses)
his/her locatable.
Every user has one or more unique public names, and these are used to identify
him/her to other users and to the LBSs. Public names can identify users by their real
names, and therefore not all public names are pseudonyms [65]. Our architecture
does not limit the number of public names that a user can possess, and with which
LBSs these public names can be used. Every LBS has a single public name that is
unique.
The relationship between a user and his/her account name is a one-to-one map-
ping, the relationship between a user’s account name and his/her public names is
a one-to-many mapping, and the relationship between an LBS and its public name
is a one-to-one mapping. Every user knows his/her complete mapping, and the
infrastructure knows the complete mapping for every user.
The infrastructure provides no external services that enable users or LBSs to
link users with account names or public names. The only way that this linkage
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can be discovered is if the user who is being linked describes the relationship using
a different medium. These types of out-of-band communications are rarely used
in the context of the Internet, because they force users to have some sort of real
relationships with each other. However, in the context of LBSs many users will have
real relationships with the users with whom they wish to share location information.
4.5 Roles
There are two different roles that are identified within our architecture:
• Targets are users who need to be sighted by the infrastructure as part of the
delivery of LBSs. Therefore, it is their privacy that the access control model
and sighting blurring algorithm are protecting.
• Requesters are users and LBSs who request sighting information about targets
from the infrastructure. An indirect requester is a user who requests sighting
information from an LBS, which then requests sightings from the infrastruc-
ture. Such an LBS is known as a proxy requester.
Both targets and requesters are identified using their public names, and a single
mobile device can be both a target and a requester simultaneously. These roles are
shown in Figure 4.1.
4.6 Sightings
A sighting for a target describes where it was, and when it was there. All sightings
contain a location component that describes where the target was sighted, and a
time interval that describes when the target was sighted. Therefore, a sighting
states that the target was somewhere within the specified location for at least one
instant during the specified time interval. The sighting accuracy of a sighting is
a measure of the quality of the sighting such that a more accurate sighting has a
smaller location and/or time interval. Sighting accuracies are always comparable.
Sighting blurring is the process of taking an existing sighting and a desired sighting
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accuracy, and creating a new sighting that has a sighting accuracy that is less than
or equal to the desired sighting accuracy.
Sightings, sighting accuracies, and sighting blurring are described in detail in
Chapter 6.
4.7 Permissions
We have developed an access control model that is implemented within the infras-
tructure within our architecture. Our access control model is based on a system
where targets create permissions that have three purposes. Firstly, they specify
which requester or requesters are entitled to obtain sightings of the target. Sec-
ondly, they specify under what circumstances these sightings are released to the
requesters. Thirdly, they specify the maximum sighting accuracy of any sightings
that are released to the requesters. A target can create multiple permissions for each
public name, and all targets and requesters are identified within these permissions
using public names. The infrastructure uses the access control model to release
sightings of targets in accordance with their permissions.
Our access control model is specifically designed for use with our architecture,
which consists of both indirect requesters and proxy requesters. Therefore, targets
create two types of permission:
• Indirect Access Permissions (IAPs) that relate to indirect requesters.
• Proxy Access Permissions (PAPs) that relate to proxy requesters.
In order for the access control model to authorise the infrastructure to release
a sighting, it must be presented with both an authorising IAP and an authorising
PAP.
Our access control model is based on a distributed implementation where the
infrastructure is not responsible for storing and selecting permissions. Therefore,
targets sign the permissions that they create in order to ensure the authenticity and
integrity of their permissions.
The access control model, PAPs, and IAPs are described in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.8 Operation
Typically, our infrastructure will be used in the following simplified scenario:
1. A user, as an indirect requester, invokes an LBS, as a proxy requester, by
sending a request for sighting information.
2. The proxy requester determines which users, as targets, need to be sighted in
order to fulfil the indirect requester’s request.
3. The proxy requester contacts the infrastructure and for each target it requests
a sighting.
4. The infrastructure invokes the access control model using an IAP and PAP for
each target in order to determine if the target is willing to allow the release of
its sightings, and at which maximum sighting accuracy.
5. The infrastructure obtains a sighting from the network operator for each target,
and incurs a charge based on the number of successful sightings.
6. The infrastructure blurs each sighting using a sighting blurring algorithm.
7. The infrastructure returns the targets’ sightings to the proxy requester.
8. The proxy requester normally processes the sightings further, and combines
them with additional information.
9. The proxy requester sends this processed sighting information to the indirect
requester.
At this stage the indirect requester can invoke the proxy requester again, and
the process repeats.
4.9 Adapted Mediated Identity Based Cryptography System
Asymmetric cryptography can be used with the X.509 PKI to provide identification
and authentication between two entities, as well as to guarantee the confidentiality,
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integrity, and non-repudiation of messages exchanged between them. However, there
are several disadvantages of using the X.509 PKI with our architecture. Possibly the
most significant disadvantage is that it is very problematic for the user to identify and
authenticate himself/herself to the LBSs without revealing his/her account name.
The most obvious approach to overcome this is for the user to maintain a key pair
for each of his/her public names. However, this may not be very practical given that
many users will use their mobile devices to access the LBSs.
In order to overcome the limitations of using the X.509 PKI we have used an
adapted version of the mediated identity based cryptography system described in
Section 2.2.3. The most significant adaptations that we made were:
• We include both the security mediator and the key generator within the in-
frastructure.
• We adapted the key generator so that the user has a single private key share
that can be used with multiple different public keys. The security mediator
has its own private key share for each of the user’s public keys. Each private
key corresponds to a user’s account name, and the public key is the user’s
public name.
The main benefits of using this mediated identity based cryptography system
instead of the X.509 PKI are:
• Users have a single private key share that can be used with many different
public keys. This reduces the storage requirements of the user’s mobile device,
and removes the need for private key selection.
• The use of a single private key share with many different public keys enables
a user and an LBS to use end-to-end encryption and signing, without the user
revealing any of his/her other identities.
• There is no need for users to retrieve and validate revocation information,
because this is managed by the infrastructure. This process is usually costly
in terms of both bandwidth and processing power.
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• All public keys are strings that represent the public names of their owners.
This identity based cryptography simplifies the management of public keys
significantly.
• If the private key share on the user’s mobile device becomes compromised
then he/she can be issued with a new private key share, and the security
mediator can be issued with new private key shares for each of the user’s
public keys. However, the user’s public names, and hence his/her public keys,
remain unchanged.
In the adapted mediated identity based cryptography system, the infrastructure
is responsible for generating the user’s private keys. These include a private key for
use with the user’s account name, and a private key for each of the user’s public
names. Each private key consists of two private key shares. One of these is the
user’s private key share, and the other is the infrastructure’s private key share. For
example, consider the user whose account name is A, and whose public names are
A1, A2, and A3. The private keys belonging to A are shown in Table 4.1.
Key Name User’s Private Key Share Infrastructure’s Private Key Share
A k−A k
−
A,I
A1 k
−
A1
k−A1,I
A2 k
−
A2
k−A2,I
A3 k
−
A3
k−A3,I
Table 4.1: Private Keys belonging to A
However, the infrastructure can generate each user’s private keys in a way that
enables the user’s private key share for his/her public names to be the same as
the user’s private key share for his/her account name. Based on our example, the
infrastructure will generate k−A1,I , k
−
A2,I
, and k−A3,I so that that k
−
A1
, k−A2 , and k
−
A3
are all equal to k−A .
Since this is an identity based cryptography system, the public keys belonging
to each user are his/her public names. However, in order to simplify our notation,
we will use our public key notation to show when a public name is being used as a
public key. Based on our example, the public keys belonging to A are A, A1, A2,
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and A3. Therefore, we will use K+A , K
+
A1
, K+A2 , and K
+
A3
to represent these public
names being used as public keys.
4.10 Protocol
The protocol that we have designed to use our architecture consists of two phases.
During the identification and authentication phase of our protocol the user, as an
indirect requester, the infrastructure, and the LBS, as a proxy requester, all identify
and authenticate each other. This is achieved using a combination of the X.509 Two-
way Authentication protocol (see Section 2.2.2) and the adapted mediated identity
based cryptography system, and our protocol establishes the same properties as
the X.509 Two-way Authentication protocol. Furthermore, shared session keys are
created that are subsequently used for symmetric cryptography in the remainder
of the session. The advantage of using symmetric cryptography is that it is more
efficient than asymmetric cryptography.
During the sighting request phase of our protocol the user, as an indirect re-
quester, invokes the LBS, as a proxy requester, by making one or more sighting
requests. This requires the indirect requester and proxy requester pair to request
sightings for one or more users, as targets.
In order to describe our protocol, we introduce the following entities:
• I is an instance of the infrastructure. Its private key is K−I and its public key
is K+I .
• L1 is an LBS. The private key associated with L1 is k−L1 , and the virtual public
key is k+L1 . The virtual private key associated with L1 is K
−
L1
and the public
key is K+L1 .
• A is a user of I whose account name is A. The private key associated with A
is k−A , and the virtual public key is k
+
A . A uses the public name A1 with L1.
The virtual private key associated with A1 is K−A1 and the public key is K
+
A1
.
• B1 and C1 are the public names used with L1 by two other users of I. Their
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virtual private keys are K−B1 and K
−
C1
respectively, and their public keys are
K+B1 and K
+
C1
respectively.
• Sightings are denoted as s1, s2, s3, . . . , and sighting accuracies are denoted as
α1, α2, α3, . . .
• P I1 , P I2 , and P I3 are IAPs that allow A1 to obtain sightings of A1, B1, and C1
respectively. PP1 , P
P
2 , P
P
3 are PAPs that allow L1 to obtain sightings of A1,
B1, and C1 respectively.
In the remainder of this section we will assume that A is using the public name
A1 to invoke a service offered by L1 that requires sightings for A1, B1, and C1.
Therefore, A1 is an indirect requester, L1 is a proxy requester, and A1, B1, and C1
are all targets. This is likely to occur if L1 is an LBS that enables a user to view
his/her friends’ locations in relation to his/her own location.
4.10.1 Identification and Authentication
In the first two steps of the identification and authentication phase of our protocol
the user and the infrastructure identify and authenticate each other as follows:
1. A→ I :M(A, I,M1,K+I , k−A)
2. I → A :M′(I, A,M2, k+A ,K−I )
The infrastructure and the LBS then identify and authenticate each other as
follows:
3. I → L1 :M(I, L1,M3, k+L1 ,K−I )
4. L1 → I :M′(L1, I,M4,K+I , k−L1)
This is effectively two different instances of the X.509 Two-way Authentication
protocol occurring in series. The user and the LBS then identify and authenticate
each other as follows:
5. A→ L1 :M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 ,K−A1)
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Figure 4.2: Identification and Authentication Sequence Diagram
6. L1 → A :M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1)
After these six steps are completed successfully A and I are identified and au-
thenticated to each other, and they have each generated KA,I . Similarly, I and L1
are identified and authenticated to each other, and they have each generated KI,L1 .
A is also identified and authenticated to L1 as A1, and L1 is identified and authen-
ticated to A as L1. Both A and L1 have each generated KA1,L1 . These three shared
session keys can then be used to symmetrically encrypt and decrypt all subsequent
communications. The complete sequence diagram for these three identification and
authentication stages is shown in Figure 4.2.
However, due to the mediated nature of our cryptography system, A and L1 are
unable to use their virtual private keys to sign the complete messages in (5) and
(6). Furthermore, they are unable to use their virtual private keys to decrypt the
messages M5 and M6 that are used to generate the shared session keys in (5) and
(6).
Therefore, A and L1 need I to assist with these signings and decryptions, and
this requires that the messages in (5) and (6) are sent via I. Therefore, (5), and (6)
are described as follows:
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5. (a) A→ I :M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 , k−A)
(b) I processesM(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 , k−A) by completing the signature to create
the signed message M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 ,K−A1)
(c) I partially decrypts {M5}K+L1 , which is contained within
M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 ,K−A1), to produce {M5}k+L1
(d) I → L1 :M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 ,K−A1),M(I, L1,K−I , {M5}k+L1 )
6. (a) L1 → I :M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 , k−L1)
(b) I processesM′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 , k−L1) by completing the signature to cre-
ate the signed message M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1)
(c) I partially decrypts {M6}K+A1 , which is contained within
M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1), to produce {M6}k+A
(d) I → A :M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1),M(I, A,K−I , {M6}k+A )
The reason that I sends both {M5}K+L1 inM(A1, L1,M5,K
+
L1
,K−A1) and {M5}k+L1
inM(I, L1,K−I , {M5}k+L1 ) to L1 in (5)(d) is that L1 needs {M5}K+L1 in order to recon-
struct the original message and then calculate its signature, and L1 needs {M5}k+L1 in
order to successfully decrypt M5. I sends {M5}k+L1 inM(I, L1,K
−
I , {M5}k+L1 ) to en-
sure its authenticity and integrity. Similarly, I sends both {M6}K+A1 in
M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1) and {M6}k+A in M(I, A,K
−
I , {M6}k+A ) to A in (6)(d) for
the same reasons.
The complete sequence diagram for the expanded version of these three identifi-
cation and authentication stages is shown in Figure 4.3.
These three instances of the X.509 Two-way Authentication protocol combined
with the adapted mediated identity based cryptography system generate eight differ-
ent message exchanges. However, some of these message exchanges can be combined
because they have a common sender and receiver. This produces a more optimised
identification and authentication protocol.
The first step of our optimised identification and authentication protocol con-
sists of A sending I a message containing the first message of A and I identifying
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Figure 4.3: Expanded Identification and Authentication Sequence Diagram
and authenticating each other, and the first message of A and L1 identifying and
authenticating each other as A1 and L1:
1. A→ I :M(A, I,M1,K+I , k−A),M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 , k−A)
The second step consists of I sending L1 a message containing the first message
of I and L1 identifying and authenticating each other, and the first message of A
and L1 identifying and authenticating each other as A1 and L1:
2. I → L1 :M(I, L1,M3, k+L1 ,K−I ),M(A1, L1,M5,K+L1 ,K−A1),M(I, L1,K−I , {M5}k+L1 )
However, this step can be optimised by including {M5}k+L1 inM(I, L1,M3, k
+
L1
,K−I ).
Therefore, the second step becomes:
2. I → L1 :M(I, L1,M3, k+L1 ,K−I , {M5}k+L1 ),M(A1, L1,M5,K
+
L1
,K−A1)
The third step consists of L1 sending I a message containing the second message
of I and L1 identifying and authenticating each other, and the second message of A
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and L1 identifying and authenticating each other as A1 and L1:
3. L1 → I :M′(L1, I,M4,K+I , k−L1),M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 , k−L1)
Finally, the fourth step consists of I sending A a message containing the sec-
ond message of A and I identifying and authenticating each other, and the second
message of A and L1 identifying and authenticating each other as A1 and L1:
4. I → A :M′(I, A,M2, k+A ,K−I ),M′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K−L1),M(I, A,K−I , {M6}k+A )
However, this step can be optimised by including {M6}k+A inM
′(I, A,M2, k+A ,K
−
I ).
Therefore, the fourth step becomes:
4. I → A :M′(I, A,M2, k+A ,K−I , {M6}k+A ),M
′(L1, A1,M6,K+A1 ,K
−
L1
)
After these four steps are completed successfully A and I are identified and
authenticated to each other, and they have each generated KA,I . Similarly, I and
L1 are identified and authenticated to each other, and they have each generated
KI,L1 . A is also identified and authenticated to L1 as A1, and L1 is identified and
authenticated to A as L1. Both A and L1 have each generated KA1,L1 . These
three shared session keys can then be used to symmetrically encrypt and decrypt all
subsequent communications. The sequence diagram for this optimised identification
and authentication protocol is shown in Figure 4.4.
4.10.2 Sighting Request
In the first step of the sighting request phase of our protocol the indirect requester
creates an indirect sighting request, and sends it to the proxy requester. This indirect
sighting request contains:
• The public name of the indirect requester.
• The public name of the proxy requester.
• The lifetime of the indirect request. This can be expressed using a start time
and a stop time, or using a number that represents the maximum number of
sighting requests that are allowed. Lifetimes are denoted using λ1, λ2, λ3, . . .
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Figure 4.4: Optimised Identification and Authentication Sequence Diagram
• The public name of the target, the required sighting accuracy, and a valid IAP,
for each target whose sighting the indirect requester wants the proxy requester
to obtain.
We denote the first indirect request, R1, which is created by A for L1 as follows:
A1, L1, λ1, ((A1, α1, P I1 ), (B1, α1, P
I
2 ), (C1, α1, P
I
3 ))
A encrypts R1 using KA1,L1 to ensure the authenticity, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity of the indirect sighting request to L1. However, these properties of the
indirect sighting request cannot be demonstrated to I, and a malicious LBS could
create any indirect sighting requests. Furthermore, the non-repudiation of this indi-
rect sighting request cannot be established. Therefore, A also signs R1 using K−A1 .
The names of the indirect requester and the proxy requester, and the lifetime, are in-
cluded in the indirect sighting request to ensure that a malicious LBS cannot launch
a replay attack. A then sends this message to L1:
1. A→ L1 : {R1}KA1,L1 , {|R1|}K−A1
63
L1 decrypts R1, verifies its signature, and verifies that the indirect sighting
request is valid. L1 then creates a proxy sighting request, R2, which contains a PAP
for each target as follows:
R1, {|R1|}K−A1 , ((A1, P
P
1 ), (B1, P
P
2 ), (C1, P
P
3 ))
L1 encrypts R2 using KI,L1 to ensure the authenticity, confidentiality, and in-
tegrity of the proxy sighting request to I. There is no need to consider a malicious
LBS creating false proxy sighting requests, because the malicious LBS will be unable
to forge the signed R1 contained in R2. However, the non-repudiation of this proxy
sighting request cannot be established, so L1 signs R2 using K−L1 . L1 then sends
this message to I
2. L1 → I : {R2}KI,L1 , {|R2|}K−L1
I decrypts R2, and verifies the signatures of both R1 and R2. I then verifies that
the indirect sighting request is valid. For each target, I validates the IAP and PAP,
and invokes the access control model to determine the maximum sighting accuracy
allowed. I compares this with the requested sighting accuracy to determine which
is lowest. I obtains a sighting from the network operator, and performs sighting
blurring. I then creates a proxy sighting response, R3, as follows:
((A1, s1), (B1, s2), (C1, s3))
I encrypts R3 using KI,L1 and signs R3 using K
−
I to establish the same properties
as the previous messages. I then sends this message to L1:
3. I → L1 : {R3}KI,L1 , {|R3|}K−I
L1 decrypts R3, and verifies its signature. L1 then processes the sighting for
each target in order to generate the indirect requester response, R4, for A.
L1 encrypts R4 using KA1,L1 and signs R4 using K
−
L1
, and sends this message to
A:
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Figure 4.5: Sighting Request Sequence Diagram
4. L1 → A : {R4}KA1,L1 , {|R4|}K−L1
A decrypts R4, and verifies its signature. A now has the sighting information
about A1, B1, and C1 that was originally requested.
The sequence diagram for the sighting request phase of our protocol is shown in
Figure 4.5.
As in the identification and authentication phase, A and L1 are unable to use
their virtual private keys to sign the messages in (1), (2), and (4), due to the mediated
nature of our cryptography system. Therefore, I completes these signatures as it
did in the identification and authentication phase.
Furthermore, in the remainder of this thesis we will not explicitly describe the
involvement of the infrastructure in mediated operations using our cryptography
system.
4.10.3 Charging
Our protocol enables a user, an LBS, and an infrastructure to identify and authen-
ticate each other. It then enables the user to obtain sighting information about
other users from the LBS, which in turn obtains this sighting information from
the infrastructure. The authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation
of all the messages used to exchange this information are established because our
protocol is based on the X.509 Two-way Authentication protocol, albeit using the
adapted mediated identity based cryptography system. These properties provide
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an opportunity to use our protocol for additional services within the context of our
architecture.
The service that interests us the most is the ability to use our protocol to charge
users in real-time for invoking LBSs, and then apportion these charges between the
LBSs and the infrastructure based on a revenue sharing model. In our architecture
we assume that the infrastructure is the entity that collects the revenue from the
user on behalf of the LBS, and the LBS in turn shares some of this revenue with the
infrastructure. This would enable the user to have a single commercial relationship
that can be used to buy services from many different LBSs. The infrastructure is
capable of revenue collection because all users must subscribe to the infrastructure
before they invoke the LBSs.
There are many possible charging services that can be built upon our protocol.
As an example, we will describe a simple charging service that enables users to
create vouchers for LBSs based on a push model. This model enables users to offer
payments to the LBSs, rather than the LBSs taking payments from the users. This
is similar to traditional payment methods, such as cash or cheque, which are used
in the real world. The advantage of this type of payment is that it gives the users
complete control over how much they pay the LBSs. This is significant because it
reduces the amount of trust that users must have in LBSs. This push model is in
contrast to the pull model, where the LBSs remove the payment from the users’
accounts. The pull model is used in most online purchases made with credit cards.
The main disadvantage of this payment model is that it requires the users to trust
the LBSs.
Our example charging service enables users, as indirect requesters, to create
vouchers. Each of these vouchers contains:
• The public name of the indirect requester.
• A nonce that is used as a serial number.
• The public name of the proxy requester.
• The lifetime of the voucher expressed using a start time and a stop time.
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• The value and currency of the voucher.
In our example, L1 charges 1e each time that it is invoked. Therefore, A creates
a voucher, V1, for L1 as follows:
A1, NA, L1, λ2, 1e
A encrypts V1 using KA,I to ensure its authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity.
However, the non-repudiation of this voucher cannot be established. Therefore, A
also signs V1 using k−A . A then sends this message to I:
1. A→ I : {V1}KA,I , {|V1|}k−A
I queries the network operator thatA uses in order to determine ifA has sufficient
funds to make a payment of 1e. If A does have sufficient funds then I reserves 1e
from A’s funds for the lifetime λ2. I then completes the signature of {|V1|}k−A to
create {|V1|}K−A1 . Therefore, we are using the mediated nature of our cryptography
system to ensure that a voucher that has been signed by the indirect requester using
its public name has been authorised by the infrastructure.
I keeps a copy of this voucher and its signature for the lifetime λ2, and I asso-
ciates these with the reservation of A’s funds. I also uses the copy of the voucher
to redeem or revoke it. I then sends the voucher and its signature back to A:
2. I → A : {V1}KA,I , {|V1|}K−A1
A now has a voucher that it can use as A1 to pay L1 a maximum amount of 1e.
A can then send this voucher and its signature to L1 as part of the indirect sighting
request message in the sighting request phase of our protocol. L1 then sends the
voucher and its signature to I as part of the proxy sighting request message in order
to redeem it. I then verifies the signature of the voucher, validates that it is being
redeemed within its lifetime, and validates that it is being redeemed by the correct
proxy requester on behalf of the correct indirect requester. I also validates that the
voucher has not been redeemed or revoked. I then applies the charge of 1e to A,
and I refunds this amount to L1.
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Alternatively, I can deduct a charge from this amount before refunding L1. For
example, if I charges L1 0.1e for each successful sighting request, then I will deduct
0.3e for sighting A1, B1, and C1. In this case, I refunds L1 with 0.7e. Therefore,
our charging service is being used to implement a revenue sharing model between
the indirect requesters, the proxy requesters, and the infrastructure.
4.11 Implementation
We have developed a partial implementation of the infrastructure entity, which we
call The Orient Platform. We use HTTP for all communications between the in-
direct requester’s mobile device and The Orient Platform, because there is already
widespread support for HTTP on most mobile devices. The indirect requester’s
mobile device sends messages to The Orient Platform using HTTP POST variables,
and receives the responses in the HTTP message body. We use an XML [72] proto-
col called The Orient Protocol, which we developed ourselves, for communications
between The Orient Platform and the LBSs. This protocol consists of four iden-
tification and authentication messages corresponding to the messages outlined in
Section 4.10.1, and four sighting request messages corresponding to the messages
outlined in Section 4.10.2.
The architecture that we are using requires all location related messages between
the indirect requester’s mobile device and the LBS to go through The Orient Plat-
form. However, the indirect requester’s mobile device must still be able to exchange
non-location related messages with both normal websites and with LBSs. There are
several different approaches that can be used to enable this mixing of non-location
related messages exchanged using HTTP and location related messages exchanged
using The Orient Protocol.
The approach that we have chosen consists of the indirect requester’s mobile
device sending all of its HTTP requests to The Orient Platform, which then deter-
mines which requests are normal HTTP requests and which requests require The
Orient Protocol. The normal HTTP requests are sent to the intended destination
server. The corresponding HTTP responses are sent back to The Orient Platform,
68
and then to the indirect requester’s mobile device. However, if The Orient Platform
determines that the original HTTP request needs to be serviced using The Orient
Protocol, then The Orient Platform sends a message using The Orient Protocol to
the relevant LBS.
This approach is relatively easy to implement because it is possible to ensure
that all of the indirect requester’s mobile device’s HTTP requests go to The Orient
Platform by configuring the indirect requester’s mobile device’s HTTP proxy address
so that it uses the address of The Orient Platform. We adopt a convention such as
using a specific port number for all HTTP requests that require The Orient Protocol.
This enables The Orient Platform to distinguish between HTTP based messages and
The Orient Protocol messages simply by examining the port number in the URL
[13]. Therefore, The Orient Platform is implemented as a non-transparent HTTP
proxy server.
4.12 Comparison with Related Research
Our architecture, which consists of a middleware entity, is similar to the architecture
described in the related research in Section 3.2. Indeed, both our infrastructure and
the middleware entities described in the related research provide similar functional-
ity. The advantage of our architecture is that it enables the infrastructure to provide
all of the common functionality regarding the users’ identity information and sight-
ing information. Perhaps the most significant disadvantage is that the infrastructure
becomes a single point of failure.
Our architecture enables users to have persistent pseudonyms that we refer to
as public names, and users can perform cryptographic operations using these public
names. The advantage of using public names is that it provides users with increased
privacy while allowing them to have persistent identifications. Our architecture
is similar to some of the architectures described in the related research in terms
of enabling users to have persistent pseudonyms. However, it differs from these
other architectures because it is the only architecture that enables users to perform
cryptographic operations using these persistent pseudonyms.
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Our protocol is specifically designed to use our architecture, and it enables users,
LBSs, and an infrastructure to achieve three-party mutual identification and au-
thentication. This has the advantage of providing greater security, although the
disadvantage of this greater security is that it requires greater resources. Our pro-
tocol is similar to some of the protocols described in the related research in terms
of supporting identification and authentication. However, it differs from these other
protocols because it supports three-party identification and authentication, whereas
the other protocols only support two-party identification and authentication. This
difference is significant in the context of our architecture that consists of users, LBSs,
and an infrastructure.
4.13 Conclusions
In this chapter we described an architecture for users, LBSs, and an infrastructure,
which is a trusted middleware entity that facilitates the operation of these LBSs over
the Internet in a secure manner. In particular, the infrastructure provides common
functionality regarding the users’ identity information and sighting information.
We have also described a protocol that is based on both the X.509 PKI and me-
diated identity based cryptography, and which uses this architecture, so that users,
LBSs, and an infrastructure can achieve three-party mutual identification and au-
thentication. This protocol allows users to simultaneously identify and authenticate
themselves to the infrastructure using an account name, and to the LBS using a
public name. Indeed, each user can be identified and authenticated using a different
public name with each LBS. This is achieved without requiring the mobile device to
have significantly greater resources, and without the need for additional messages to
be exchanged. This usage of public names with LBSs provides users with increased
privacy without necessarily reducing the usefulness of the LBSs. The confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages can be guaranteed, and
we described how this can be used so that a user receives sighting information from
an LBS, which in turn receives this sighting information from the infrastructure.
Finally, we will build upon this architecture and protocol in Chapter 5 in order
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to describe our access control model, and in Chapter 6 in order to describe our
sighting blurring algorithm.
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Chapter 5
Access Control Model
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we described an architecture for users, an infrastructure, and LBSs,
which facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the Internet. We also described
a protocol that enables these three entities to achieve three-party mutual identifica-
tion and authentication. In particular, this protocol allows users to simultaneously
identify and authenticate themselves to the infrastructure using one identity, and to
the LBS using another identity. This protocol then guarantees the confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages.
In this chapter we describe an access control model that is implemented within
the infrastructure. This access control model is based on users who are targets
creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and for LBSs that are
proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled to obtain
sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings are released,
and the maximum accuracy of these sightings.
5.2 Requirements
We have identified the following requirements that our access control model must
satisfy:
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• Requirement 1
The access control model must allow users to specify who is entitled
to obtain their sightings in terms of users, LBSs, or both users and
LBSs.
Users may base their security specifications on the identities of the users,
as indirect requesters, with whom they are willing to share their sightings.
Indeed, Lederer, Mankoff, and Dey found that the indirect requester’s identity
is a significant determinant of users’ security specifications [49]. This type of
security specification can be represented using a permission that contains a
single subject to represent the indirect requester. However, such a permission
can be used with many different LBSs, as proxy requesters, and this might not
be in accordance with the user’s security specification.
Alternatively, users may base their security specifications on the identities
of the proxy requesters, with which they are willing to share their sightings.
For example, Barkhuus and Dey found that the proxy requester’s identity is
a significant determinant of users’ security specifications [9]. This type of
security specification can be represented using a permission that contains a
single subject to represent the proxy requester. However, such a permission
can be used with many different indirect requesters, and this might not be in
accordance with the user’s security specification.
However, there may be occasions when users will want to base their secu-
rity specifications on the identities of both the indirect requesters and the
proxy requesters simultaneously. This has the effect of allowing a user to ei-
ther increase or decrease the level of trust that he/she has in the requesters
if they cooperate with each other. For example, consider the simplified ex-
ample where a user, Stefano, is willing to let another user, Carlotta, obtain
his sightings with a low sighting accuracy using any LBS. Therefore, Stefano
creates a permission in which Carlotta is the subject. Carlotta can use this
permission with an LBS called FriendFinder that displays Stefano’s location
on a map, and Stefano’s privacy will be respected because FriendFinder will
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only be able to obtain his sightings with a low sighting accuracy. Now con-
sider another LBS called NearbyFriendFinder that enables Carlotta to obtain
Stefano’s sightings with a very high sighting accuracy, but only if both Ste-
fano and Carlotta are currently sighted very close to each other. Carlotta will
be unable to use NearbyFriendFinder to obtain Stefano’s sightings, because
NearbyFriendFinder requires Stefano’s sightings with a high sighting accu-
racy, and Stefano is only willing to let Carlotta obtain his sightings with a low
sighting accuracy. However, since NearbyFriendFinder only releases Stefano’s
sightings in very limited circumstances, he is willing to let it obtain his sight-
ings with a high sighting accuracy. Stefano cannot specify this permission in
terms of NearbyFriendFinder alone, because NearbyFriendFinder would then
be able to obtain Stefano’s sightings with a high sighting accuracy at any time.
Therefore, Stefano’s security specification is based on both Carlotta and Near-
byFriendFinder. This type of security specification can be represented using
a permission that contains both a subject to represent the indirect requester
and a subject to represent the proxy requester.
However, representing a security specification using a single permission that
must contain both a subject to represent the indirect requester and a subject
to represent the proxy requester is neither efficient nor scalable. Consider an
example where Stefano wants to base his security specifications on m indirect
requesters and n proxy requesters. In this example Stefano will need to create
m ∗ n different permissions. Stefano must then create n new permissions for
each new indirect requester that he wants to include in his security specifi-
cations. The creation of these new permissions for every proxy requester has
the effect of allowing a user to specify that the indirect requester can obtain
his/her sightings using any proxy requester that he/she already trusts. Sim-
ilarly, Stefano must create m new permissions for each new proxy requester
that he wants to include in his security specifications. The creation of these
new permissions for every indirect requester has the effect of allowing a user to
specify that the proxy requester can obtain his/her sightings using any indirect
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requester that he/she already trusts.
Therefore, the access control model must allow users to independently express
levels of trust in both indirect requesters and proxy requesters, but the access
control model must not allow either the trusted indirect requesters or the
trusted proxy requesters to request sightings unilaterally.
• Requirement 2
The access control model must allow users to specify the circum-
stances in which their sightings are released.
Users may base their security specifications on factors that are external to the
access control model. For example, Anthony, Henderson, and Kotz found that
users expressed different levels of willingness to share their sightings depending
on their current locations [3]. Lederer, Mankoff, and Dey found that users
expressed different levels of willingness to share their sightings depending on
their current activities [49].
• Requirement 3
The access control model must allow users to specify the maximum
sighting accuracy of any sightings that are released.
Typically, users will specify a greater sighting accuracy for indirect requesters
and proxy requesters that are trusted. This sighting accuracy that is output
from the access control model is then used to determine part of the input to
our sighting blurring algorithm, as described in Chapter 6.
Our access control model, which supports these three requirements, enables users
to create permissions that support a wide range of security specifications from very
simple security specifications to very complex and personalised security specifica-
tions. This ability to support a wide range of security specifications will encourage
the usage of LBSs by users, according to the findings of Anthony, Henderson, and
Kotz in their empirical study of users’ security requirements in the context of LBSs
[3].
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Since our access control model is required to allow users to create permissions
regarding their own sightings, our access control model provides a form of Discre-
tionary Access Control (DAC).
In Section 5.6 we will compare our access control model and its requirements
with the related research described in Section 3.3.
5.3 Mathematical Model
In this section we describe the mathematical model upon which we build our access
control model. In particular, we define the types, permissions, and access control
algorithm that our access control model uses.
5.3.1 Types
There are three different types defined within the mathematical model of our access
control model:
• We define N as the set of public names for users and LBSs. These public
names are strings that have a consistent syntax. We define P(N ) as the power
set of N .
• We define B as the set of boolean values. Therefore, B = {True, False}.
• We define A as the totally ordered set of sighting accuracies. We denote
the sighting containing the location consisting of the entire universe, with a
duration of all time, as ⊥. The sighting accuracy of ⊥ is α⊥, and α⊥ is used
to mean no sighting accuracy. Therefore, α⊥ is the least element in A.
5.3.2 Permissions
Our access control model is based on targets creating permissions that specify which
requesters are entitled to obtain sightings of which targets, under what circumstances
these sightings are released, and the maximum accuracy of these sightings. A target
can create multiple permissions for each public name, and all targets and requesters
are identified within these permissions using public names. The infrastructure uses
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our access control model to release sightings of targets in accordance with their
permissions.
Our access control model is specifically designed for use with our architecture,
which consists of both indirect requesters and proxy requesters. Therefore, our
access control model enables users to specify two different types of permission. The
first type of permission is used to specify which indirect requesters are trusted, and
therefore can obtain sightings, and the second type of permission is used to specify
which proxy requesters are trusted, and therefore can obtain sightings. This has
the effect of creating a whitelist for users, and a separate whitelist for LBSs. The
access control model will only allow sightings to be released if it is presented with
both a valid permission specified in terms of users, and a valid permission specified
in terms of LBSs.
Indirect Access Permission
An IAP is used by a target to specify which indirect requesters can indirectly access
the infrastructure via a proxy requester to obtain its sightings, and at what accuracy
these sightings can be obtained. Since an IAP only allows an indirect requester to
indirectly access the infrastructure, this permission cannot be used on its own.
We define the set of IAP permissions as:
PIAP = N × P(N )× P(N )× B× A
Given the IAP 〈t, I, P, c, α〉 ∈ PIAP we have:
• t is the public name of the target that created this permission.
• I specifies which indirect requesters are allowed to use this permission to obtain
sightings of t indirectly via a proxy requester in P .
• P specifies which proxy requesters are allowed to use this permission to act
as a proxy in order to obtain sightings of t directly from the infrastructure on
behalf of an indirect requester in I.
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• c is used to determine if a sighting will be released based on parameters that
are outside the scope of both the access control model and the sighting blurring
algorithm. The access control model will never release a sighting accuracy if
this value is False. Therefore, if t does not want to specify any condition,
then it simply sets this value to True.
• α is the sighting accuracy at which t can be sighted.
Proxy Access Permission
A PAP is used by a target to specify which proxy requesters can directly access the
infrastructure when operating as proxies for indirect requesters to obtain sightings
of the target, and at what accuracy these sightings can be obtained. Since a PAP
only allows a proxy requester to directly access the infrastructure when operating
as a proxy for an indirect requester, this permission cannot be used on its own.
Therefore, it is always used with an IAP.
We define the set of PAP permissions as:
PPAP = N × P(N )× P(N )× B× A× B
Given the PAP 〈t, P, I, c, α, o〉 ∈ PPAP we have:
• t is the public name of the target that created this permission.
• P specifies which proxy requesters are allowed to use this permission to act
as a proxy in order to obtain sightings of t directly from the infrastructure on
behalf of an indirect requester in I.
• I specifies which indirect requesters are allowed to use this permission to obtain
sightings of t indirectly via a proxy requester in P .
• c is used to determine if a sighting will be released based on parameters that
are outside the scope of both the access control model and the sighting blurring
algorithm. The access control model will never release a sighting accuracy if
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this value is False. Therefore, if t does not want to specify any condition,
then it simply sets this value to True.
• α is the sighting accuracy at which t can be sighted.
• o is used to specify which of the sighting accuracies used in the IAP and the
PAP has priority. If this value is True, then the access control model should
use the sighting accuracy specified in this PAP. Otherwise the sighting accu-
racy specified in the IAP is used. This priority is assigned to the appropriate
sighting accuracy regardless of which sighting accuracy is more accurate. In
other words, the override parameter can be used to increase or decrease the
sighting accuracy specified in the IAP. t sets this parameter based on its pref-
erences, and t’s reasoning for using this parameter is external to the access
control model.
The set of all access permissions is defined as PAP = PIAP ∪ PPAP.
5.3.3 Access Control Algorithm
Our access control model uses the access control algorithm described in Algorithm
1 when an indirect requester accesses the infrastructure via a proxy requester with
an IAP and a PAP.
There are four inputs to the access control algorithm. These are the public name
of the indirect requester, the public name of the proxy requester, and the IAP and
PAP that they are supplying.
The output of the access control algorithm is always a sighting accuracy. How-
ever, in circumstances where the access control algorithm determines that the target
is unwilling to allow the requesters to obtain a sighting then the sighting accuracy
will be α⊥.
5.3.4 Examples
In order to demonstrate how our access control algorithm operates on IAPs and
PAPs we will present some simple examples. These examples are based on the
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Algorithm 1: The Access Control Algorithm
Input: i is the public name of the indirect requester.
Input: p is the public name of the proxy requester.
Input: The supplied IAP 〈t1, I1, P1, c1, α1〉 ∈ PIAP.
Input: The supplied PAP 〈t2, P2, I2, c2, α2, o〉 ∈ PPAP.
Output: The allowed sighting accuracy.
if t1 6= t2 then
return α⊥
if (i /∈ I1) ∨ (i /∈ I2) then
return α⊥
if (p /∈ P2) ∨ (p /∈ P1) then
return α⊥
if (¬c1) ∨ (¬c2) then
return α⊥
if o then
return α2
return α1
following definitions of N and A:
N = {A1, B1, C1, D1, E1, F1, G1, H1}
A = {α⊥, α1, α2, α3, α4}
• Example 1
The inputs to the access control algorithm are the indirect requester E1, the
proxy requester G1, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈B1, {D1, E1}, {G1}, True, α2〉
〈E1, {G1}, {D1, B1}, True, α4, True〉
The access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of α⊥ because the
target in each permission is different.
• Example 2
The inputs to the access control algorithm are the indirect requester F1, the
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proxy requester G1, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈B1, {D1, E1}, {G1}, True, α2〉
〈B1, {G1}, {D1, E1, F1}, True, α4, True〉
The access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of α⊥ because
F1 /∈ {D1, E1} in the IAP.
• Example 3
The inputs to the access control algorithm are the indirect requester E1, the
proxy requester G1, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈B1, {D1, E1}, {G1}, True, α2〉
〈B1, {G1}, {D1, E1}, True, α4, True〉
The access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of α4. If the
override parameter in the PAP was False, then the access control algorithm
would have returned a sighting accuracy of α2. In this case, specifying a
sighting accuracy of α4 in the PAP is unnecessary, so it can be replaced with
α⊥.
5.4 Notation
In this section we describe an abstract syntax for a notation that expresses permis-
sions in our access control model.
5.4.1 Boolean Expressions
Our access control model is based on permissions that contain sets of requesters.
There are two significant disadvantages associated with this approach where the
sets of requesters are stated explicitly within the permissions. Firstly, targets must
revoke old permissions and create new permissions every time that they want to
81
add or remove a requester from an existing permission. Secondly, every time that
the access control algorithm is invoked it must enumerate entire sets of requesters.
As the sets of requesters in permissions grow larger, this approach becomes more
cumbersome.
The disadvantages of this approach can be overcome by specifying these sets
of requesters using set comprehension. However, calculating the set of requesters
satisfying some predicate would be inefficient.
Fortunately, our access control algorithm only needs to perform a membership
test in order to determine if a given requester is a member of a given set of requesters.
This enables us to represent sets as predicates over requester names. Therefore, we
will use boolean expressions, which contain a free variable representing the name of
the requester to be tested, in our notation instead of predicates.
5.4.2 Abstract Syntax
The use of boolean expressions allows us to define the abstract syntax of IAPs and
PAPs as follows:
IAP ::= 〈Name, BExp, BExp, BExp, Accuracy〉
PAP ::= 〈Name, BExp, BExp, BExp, Accuracy, BExp〉
A Name is a syntactic representation of a value from N , a BExp is a boolean
expression, and an Accuracy is a valid sighting accuracy from A. The concept of
a boolean expression is well understood, and therefore we only provide a partial
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definition of its abstract syntax:
BExp ::= True
| False
| ¬BExp
| BExp ∧BExp
| BExp ∨BExp
| User ∈ {Userlist}
| User ∈ {User.Attribute}
| User.Attribute
| User.Attribute = V alue
| . . .
A User is either an explicitly named user, or a variable that represents a user.
There are three different variables that targets can use in the boolean expressions
within the permissions that they create. The target itself is represented using #t,
the indirect requester is represented using #i, and the proxy requester is represented
using #p. System is a special user that represents the system that is hosting the
access control model. These variables are needed because the target does not nec-
essarily know who these entities are when it is creating the permission. They are
replaced with the actual values by the access control model immediately before the
access control algorithm is invoked. The abstract syntax of the partial definition of
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a User is defined as follows:
User ::= Name
| #t
| #i
| #p
| System
| User.Attribute
| . . .
An Attribute is the name of an attribute of a User. There are many different
attribute names, and these will depend on the underlying implementation of the
access control model. Userlist and V alue both have implicit definitions of their
abstract syntax, and therefore we have not explicitly defined them.
5.4.3 Modified Access Control Algorithm
The access control algorithm that we previously defined in Algorithm 1 needs to
modified to allow boolean expressions to be used in place of the sets. This modified
access control algorithm is described in Algorithm 2.
5.4.4 Examples
In order to demonstrate how our modified access control algorithm operates on
IAPs and PAPs that contain boolean expressions we will present some more exam-
ples. These examples are based on the following example definitions of Name and
Accuracy:
Name ::= Stefano | Carlotta | Maria | Ilaria | Alexia
| FriendFinder | ColleagueFinder
Accuracy ::= α⊥ | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4
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Algorithm 2: The Modified Access Control Algorithm
Input: i is the public name of the indirect requester.
Input: p is the public name of the proxy requester.
Input: The supplied IAP 〈t1, i1, p1, c1, α1〉.
Input: The supplied PAP 〈t2, p2, i2, c2, α2, o〉.
Output: The allowed sighting accuracy.
if t1 6= t2 then
return α⊥
if (¬i1) ∨ (¬i2) then
return α⊥
if (¬p2) ∨ (¬p1) then
return α⊥
if (¬c1) ∨ (¬c2) then
return α⊥
if o then
return α2
return α1
The example values in Accuracy can be used by our sighting blurring algorithm,
which is described in Chapter 6.
The boolean expressions in our examples also use the following attributes:
• Friends is a set attribute that represents a User’s friends. In these examples
Maria.Friends is {Ilaria, Alexia}.
• isUser is a boolean attribute that is True if a User is a user, and False if a
User is an LBS.
• IMStatus is a string attribute that represents a User’s instant messenger sta-
tus.
• Day is a time attribute that represents the current day. It is an attribute of
the System user.
• CurrentLocation is an attribute that represents a User’s current location,
and HomeLocation is an attribute that represents a User’s home location.
The following examples are based on two requesters indirectly accessing the
infrastructure with an IAP and a PAP.
• Example 4
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The inputs to the modified access control algorithm are the indirect requester
Ilaria, the proxy requester ColleagueFinder, and the following IAP and
PAP:
〈Maria, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, #p ∈ {FriendFinder, ColleagueFinder},
True, 3〉
〈Maria, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, True, α⊥, False〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of α⊥
because #p is not a member of {FriendFinder} in the PAP.
• Example 5
If the proxy requester in Example 4 is FriendFinder, then the modified access
control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 3.
Additionally, if the indirect requester is Stefano, the modified access control
algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of α⊥ because #i is not a member of
Maria.Friends in both the IAP and the PAP. However, if Maria adds Stefano
to her Friends attribute, then the modified access control algorithm will return
a sighting accuracy of 3. This is significant, because the returned sighting
accuracy changes without either the IAP or PAP permissions changing.
• Example 6
The inputs to the modified access control algorithm are the indirect requester
Ilaria, the proxy requester FriendFinder, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈Stefano, #i.isUser, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, True, 2〉
〈Stefano, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Maria, Alexia},
¬((#System.Day = “Saturday”) ∨ (#System.Day = “Sunday”)),
3, True〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 3 if
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it is invoked on a weekday, or α⊥ if it is invoked on either a Saturday or a
Sunday.
• Example 7
If Stefano wanted the indirect requester Ilaria, using the proxy requester
FriendFinder, to receive a sighting with a sighting accuracy of 4 on a weekday,
or a sighting accuracy of 2 on either a Saturday or a Sunday, then he would
create the following PAP in addition to the IAP in Example 6:
〈Stefano, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Maria, Alexia}, True, 4,
¬((#System.Day = “Saturday”) ∨ (#System.Day = “Sunday”))〉
This example shows how a boolean expression can be used to specify which
sighting accuracy has priority.
• Example 8
The inputs to the modified access control algorithm are the indirect requester
Ilaria, the proxy requester FriendFinder, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈Maria, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Alexia}, ¬#p.isUser, True, 2〉
〈Maria, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i.isUser, True, α⊥, False〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 2. This
IAP effectively allows Ilaria to obtain sightings for Maria, with a sighting
accuracy of 2, using any LBS that Maria trusts. However, if Maria has a
higher trust in sighting requests jointly from Ilaria and FriendFinder, then
Maria creates the following IAP that can be used with the previous PAP:
〈Maria, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Alexia}, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, True, 3〉
• Example 9
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The inputs to the modified access control algorithm are the indirect requester
Maria, the proxy requester FriendFinder, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈Stefano, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Maria, Alexia}, ¬#p.isUser, True, 1〉
〈Stefano, ¬#p.isUser, #i ∈ {Ilaria, Maria, Alexia}, True, α⊥, False〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 1.
This IAP and PAP have the effect of allowing Ilaria, Maria and Alexia to
indirectly retrieve Stefano’s sightings with a sighting accuracy of 1 using any
LBS as the proxy requester. Therefore, this PAP enables Stefano to allow
Ilaria, Maria and Alexia to delegate the sighting request rights that he
gave them to any LBS.
5.4.5 Semantics
The access control model must enforce certain semantic rules at run-time, and if
these rules are violated then it will return a sighting accuracy of α⊥.
Consider again a system based on the previous definitions, where the inputs to
the modified access control algorithm are the indirect requester Ilaria, the proxy
requester FriendFinder, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈Maria, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, ¬#p.isUser, Alexia.IMStatus = “Online”, 3〉
〈Maria, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, True, α⊥, False〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 3 if
Alexia’s instant messenger status is “Online”, and otherwise it will return a sighting
accuracy of α⊥.
If Ilaria successfully uses this IAP to obtain a sighting accuracy of 3 for Maria,
then Ilaria can determine that Alexia’s instant messenger status was “Online”.
If Maria can determine that Ilaria successfully uses this IAP to obtain a sighting
accuracy of 3, then Maria also knows that Alexia’s instant messenger status was
“Online”. However, Alexia has not been part of this invocation of the access control
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model, and she might be unwilling to share her instant messenger status with Ilaria
and Maria.
Therefore, only the target’s attributes and the indirect requester’s attributes can
be accessed within an IAP, and only the target’s attributes and the proxy requester’s
attributes can be accessed within a PAP. (The System user is an exception, because
its attributes can be contained in any permission.) The access control model returns
a sighting accuracy of α⊥ if it is presented with a permission that contains attributes
for a user who is neither the target nor the appropriate requester.
The use of the targets’ and requesters’ attributes within permissions can re-
veal additional information. For example, consider that the inputs to the modi-
fied access control algorithm are the indirect requester Ilaria, the proxy requester
FriendFinder, and the following IAP and PAP:
〈Maria, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, #p ∈ {FriendFinder, ColleagueFinder},
#i.IMStatus = “Online”, 2〉
〈Maria, #p ∈ {FriendFinder}, #i ∈ Maria.Friends, True, α⊥, False〉
The modified access control algorithm will return a sighting accuracy of 2 if
Ilaria’s instant messenger status is “Online”, and otherwise it will return a sighting
accuracy of α⊥.
Again, if Ilaria successfully uses this IAP to obtain a sighting accuracy of 2
for Maria, then Maria can determine that Ilaria’s instant messenger status was
“Online”. Initially, this ability of a target to obtain information about the requesters
appears to be a breach of the requesters’ security. This becomes more apparent if
we consider an attribute such as atHome that returns True if a User is in his/her
house and False otherwise.
However, there is no loss of security associated with this ability. This is because
each requester can inspect the permission to determine which of its attributes will
be accessed, and hence shared with the target. If it is not willing to share these at-
tributes with the target then it does not use the permission. Similarly, the target will
not create any permissions containing attributes that reveal additional information
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to the requesters.
5.5 Implementation
Our access control model can be implemented as either a centralised system or a dis-
tributed system. In the centralised implementation the infrastructure is responsible
for storing and selecting permissions. The main advantage of this implementation
is that the requesters do not need to store and manage permissions. However, there
are also significant disadvantages associated with this implementation. In partic-
ular, the infrastructure must determine which combinations of IAPs and PAPs to
use. This could be difficult, because it is likely that there will be many suitable
combinations for any indirect requester and proxy requester pair.
Therefore, we decided to focus on a distributed implementation of our access
control model, where the requesters are responsible for storing and selecting permis-
sions. When an indirect requester and a proxy requester pair require a sighting of a
target, the indirect requester selects an IAP and the proxy requester selects a PAP.
Both of these permissions are then supplied to the infrastructure.
The main advantage of this implementation is that there is no need to centrally
store and manage permissions, and this facilitates scalability. Also, requesters can
choose the permissions that they want to supply to the infrastructure, which gives
them complete control over permission selection. The most significant disadvan-
tage of this implementation is that users must manage the permissions themselves,
and these permissions may need to be stored on mobile devices that have limited
resources.
The distributed nature of these permissions raises some important security issues,
and in particular, it must be possible to verify the authenticity and integrity of
permissions. Therefore, we propose that users sign the permissions that they create,
using our adapted meditated identity based cryptography system (see Section 4.9).
Users also need to be able to revoke the permissions that they create. Therefore, each
permission has a commencement date and an expiry date, and revoked permissions
are identified by the infrastructure until they expire.
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When an indirect requester and a proxy requester require a sighting of a target,
the indirect requester selects an IAP and the proxy requester selects a PAP. Both
of these permissions are then supplied to the infrastructure, and the infrastructure
performs the following steps:
1. It uses our meditated identity based cryptography system to test the validity
of both permissions by verifying their signatures using the public key of the
user who created the permissions.
2. It verifies that the current date is between the commencement date and the
expiry date of both permissions, and it ensures that neither permission has
been revoked.
3. It parses both permissions and ensures that they are both syntactically and
semantically correct.
4. It invokes the access control model to evaluate the IAP and PAP combination
in order to determine the appropriate sighting accuracy for the target.
Although we are using our adapted meditated identity based cryptography sys-
tem, it is possible to use any PKI with our access control model.
5.6 Comparison with Related Research
In this section we describe how our access control model satisfies the requirements
that we identified in Section 5.2. We also compare it with the related research
described in Section 3.3 in terms of our requirements. In particular, we identify
its advantages and disadvantages, and we identify the similarities and differences
between it and the related research.
• Requirement 1
The access control model must allow users to specify who is entitled
to obtain their sightings in terms of users, LBSs, or both users and
LBSs.
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Our access control model satisfies this requirement by allowing users to specify
who is entitled to obtain their sightings in terms of users or LBSs. Therefore,
it is similar to the single subject centralised access control models and the
single subject distributed access control models in this regard.
Our access control model fully satisfies this requirement by also allowing users
to specify who is entitled to obtain their sightings in terms of both users and
LBSs. This aspect of our access control model is different to both the single
subject centralised access control models and the single subject distributed
access control models. Furthermore, it allows users to independently express
levels of trust in both users and LBSs. However, it requires that a user and an
LBS cooperate with each other in order to obtain a user’s sightings. There-
fore, our access control model is similar to the dual subject centralised access
control models in this regard. However, it differs from the dual subject cen-
tralised access control models because none of them recognise users and LBSs
as distinct, but equally important, subjects.
The advantage of our access control model allowing users to specify who is
entitled to obtain their sightings in terms of users, LBSs, or both users and
LBSs, is that it provides users with more control over the release of their
sightings. Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of this extra control is
that it introduces additional complexity to the users.
• Requirement 2
The access control model must allow users to specify the circum-
stances in which their sightings are released.
Our access control model satisfies this requirement because both the IAPs and
the PAPs include a condition that enables the user who creates the permission
to specify the circumstances in which his/her sightings are released. This con-
dition can be based on any parameters that are outside the scope of the access
control model, and which are supported by the underlying implementation of
the access control model.
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Our access control model is similar to several of the single subject centralised
access control models and dual subject centralised access control models de-
scribed in the related research because they also satisfy this requirement by
allowing users to specify the circumstances in which their sightings are released.
• Requirement 3
The access control model must allow users to specify the maximum
sighting accuracy of any sightings that are released.
Our access control model satisfies this requirement because both the IAPs and
the PAPs allow the user who creates the permission to specify the maximum
sighting accuracy of any of his/her sightings that are released. Our access
control model does not make any assumptions about what type of sighting
blurring algorithm will subsequently be used before the user’s sightings are
released. Therefore, it treats the sighting accuracies in an algorithm neutral
manner. However, in Chapter 6 we will describe the sighting accuracies that
we have defined for use by our sighting blurring algorithm.
Our access control model is similar to many of the access control models de-
scribed in the related research that satisfy this requirement because they also
allow users to specify the sighting accuracy of any sightings that are released.
However, these access control models generally describe sighting accuracies
that are specifically designed for a single type of sighting blurring algorithm.
The advantage of our access control model allowing users to specify the max-
imum sighting accuracy of any sightings that are released, is that it provides
users with more control over the release of their sightings. Perhaps the most
significant disadvantage of this extra control is that it introduces additional
complexity to the users.
Some of the access control models described in the related research support
permission delegation. Our access control model is similar to these access control
models in this regard, because it allows users to create permissions that can be
delegated.
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The object in every permission within our access control model is always a user.
This differs from some of the access control models described in the related research
that allow the object in the permissions to be a location.
Finally, our access control model can be implemented as either a centralised ac-
cess control model or as a distributed access control model. However, we decided
to focus on the distributed implementation of our access control model, and our
implementation has many similarities with the single subject distributed access con-
trol models described in the related research that use public key cryptography and
certificates. The main advantage of the distributed implementation of our access
control model is that there is no need to centrally store and manage permissions.
This facilitates both redundancy and scalability. The most significant disadvantage
of the distributed implementation of our access control model is that users and LBSs
must store and manage the permissions.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we described an access control model that is implemented within
the infrastructure within our architecture. Our access control model is based on
users who are targets creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and
for LBSs that are proxy requesters. There are two types of permission within our
access control model - IAPs that are used by indirect requesters, and PAPs that are
used by proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled
to obtain sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings are
released, and the maximum accuracy of these sightings. Our access control model is
then responsible for releasing users’ sightings in accordance with their permissions.
When an indirect requester and a proxy requester pair request a sighting of a target,
they must supply the infrastructure with an IAP and a PAP.
The main novelty of our access control model is that it enables users to specify
two different types of permission - IAPs and PAPs. This has the effect of creating
a whitelist for users, and a separate whitelist for LBSs. The access control model
will only allow sightings to be released if it is presented with both a valid permission
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specified in terms of users, and a valid permission specified in terms of LBSs.
Finally, we will use the sighting accuracy output from our access control model to
determine the sighting accuracy part of the input to our sighting blurring algorithm
in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
Sighting Blurring Algorithm
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we described an architecture for users, an infrastructure, and LBSs,
which facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the Internet. We also described
a protocol that enables these three entities to achieve three-party mutual identifica-
tion and authentication. In particular, this protocol allows users to simultaneously
identify and authenticate themselves to the infrastructure using one identity, and to
the LBS using another identity. This protocol then guarantees the confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages.
In Chapter 5 we described an access control model that is implemented within
the infrastructure. This access control model is based on users who are targets
creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and for LBSs that are
proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled to obtain
sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings are released,
and the maximum accuracy of these sightings.
In this chapter we describe the sighting blurring algorithm that we have de-
veloped, which is implemented within the infrastructure in our architecture. Our
sighting blurring algorithm offers users increased privacy by decreasing the accuracy
of their sightings based on the maximum sighting accuracy allowed by the access
control model described in Chapter 5.
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6.2 Mathematical Model
In this section we define the concepts of sightings, sighting accuracy, sighting blur-
ring, and location translation, in a mathematical context. These concepts will then
be used extensively in the remainder of this chapter in order to describe our sighting
blurring algorithm.
6.2.1 Sightings
A sighting describes where a target was, and when it was there. Therefore, each
sighting contains a location that describes where the user was sighted, and a time
interval that describes when the user was sighted.
In order to define a location, we will first define a position p ∈ P as a tuple in a
coordinate space. A location l ∈ L is then defined as an area such that p ∈ l is true
if the position p is within the area of the location l. A location is defined as a set of
polygons. However, we consider that locations approximate squares for the sake of
simplicity.
We define a subset relation on locations as:
l ⊆ l′ ⇔ ∀p ∈ l · p ∈ l′
The size of the area making up a location l is defined by the real number |l|. If
l ⊆ l′, then |l| ≤ |l′|.
In order to define a time interval, we will first define a time t ∈ T as an absolute
time relative to some epoch. This can be represented as an integer value, such as
the number of milliseconds from a given time and date. A time interval i ∈ I is a
range defined by a start time and an end time. t ∈ i is true if the time t occurs
within the time interval i.
We define a subset relation on time intervals as:
i ⊆ i′ ⇔ ∀t ∈ i · t ∈ i′
The duration of a time interval i is defined by the real number |i|. If i ⊆ i′ then
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|i| ≤ |i′|.
A sighting s ∈ S is a pair 〈l, i〉 ∈ L × I, where |l| > 0 and |i| > 0. It states
that a target was located somewhere within l at some time during the time interval
i. This definition requires the location component l of sighting s to be a non-empty
area. Therefore, a sighting can never represent a single position. In reality this is
not an issue, because the underlying positioning technology does not return points.
However, we can always approximate a single position p by selecting a location l
with a sufficiently small area such that p ∈ l. Similarly, a time interval within a
sighting can never represent a single point in time.
We define a sighting s1 = 〈l1, i1〉 to approximate another sighting s2 = 〈l2, i2〉
if l2 ⊆ l1 and i2 ⊆ i1. We denote this as s1 v s2, and we note that v forms a
partial order. We denote the sighting containing the location consisting of the entire
universe, with a duration of all time, as ⊥. Clearly ⊥ v s for all sightings s ∈ S.
6.2.2 Sighting Accuracy
Consider a sighting s, with two approximations s1 and s2. This is denoted as s1 v s
and s2 v s. Assume that both s1 and s2 have the same time interval, but overlapping
locations. Therefore, s1 6v s2 and s2 6v s1. In this case we cannot claim that either
sighting approximates the other. Therefore, we have no way to compare s1 and s2.
In order to allow a useful comparison of sightings that are not comparable using
v we introduce a metric to compute the quality of a sighting as a single numeric
value. We call this metric a sighting accuracy function.
A function f ∈ S → R is a sighting accuracy function if it has the following
properties:
• The sighting accuracy function applied to the location consisting of the entire
universe with a duration of all time will produce a sighting quality of zero.
This is denoted as:
f(⊥) = 0
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• The sighting accuracy function applied to any possible sightings will always
produce sighting qualities that are greater than or equal to zero. This is
denoted as:
∀s ∈ S · f(s) ≥ 0
• Given any two sightings, if one sighting approximates the other sighting, then
the sighting quality of the first sighting will be less than or equal to the sighting
quality of the second sighting. This is denoted as:
∀s1, s2 ∈ S · s1 v s2 ⇒ f(s1) ≤ f(s2)
As an example of a sighting accuracy function, we can define f1 ∈ S → R as
follows:
f1(⊥) = 0
f1(〈l, i〉) = 1|l| × |i|
We let A be the set of functions of type S → R that satisfy these properties.
6.2.3 Sighting Blurring
Sighting blurring is the process of taking an existing sighting, and a desired sighting
accuracy that is less than the sighting accuracy of the existing sighting, and creating
a new sighting that has a sighting accuracy that is less than or equal to the desired
sighting accuracy.
Many LBSs will not be hindered from offering useful services by sighting blurring,
because these LBSs will not require very accurate sightings. For example, an LBS
that enables a user to locate all touristic attractions within 100,000m does not need
the user’s sightings with an accuracy greater than 1,000m.
Given a sighting accuracy function f ∈ A, then a function g ∈ S × R → S is a
sighting blurring function if it has the following properties:
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• The sighting produced by a sighting blurring function will always approximate
the original sighting that was used by the sighting blurring function. This is
denoted as:
g(s, α) v s
• The sighting accuracy of the sighting produced by a sighting blurring function
will always be less than or equal to the original sighting accuracy that was
used by the sighting blurring function. This is denoted as:
f(g(s, α)) ≤ α
We define B as the set of all functions of type S × R → S that satisfy these
properties.
Given the sightings s1 = 〈l1, i1〉 and s2 = 〈l2, i2〉, and the sighting blurring
function g(s1, α) = s2, then we define g as a sighting blurring function that performs
spatial blurring if, and only if, l1 ⊂ l2. Similarly, we define g as a sighting blurring
function that performs temporal blurring if, and only if, i1 ⊂ i2.
For all functions f ∈ A, the function g defined by g(s, α) = ⊥ is a sighting
blurring function that uses a combination of spatial blurring and temporal blurring.
However, this sighting blurring function is not very useful because the LBS will not
be able to offer a meaningful service to the user. Therefore, it is vital that the
sighting blurring function provides the correct amount of blurring and at the same
time produces useful approximations.
In practice a user, as the indirect requester, and an LBS, as the proxy requester,
will require sightings with a minimum sighting accuracy, αmin, and a user, as a
target, will be prepared to allow the release of sightings with a maximum sighting
accuracy, αmax. In order for the indirect requester to obtain a useful service from
the proxy requester we require that αmin ≤ αmax.
However, the infrastructure can use any sighting accuracy, αactual, with the sight-
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ing blurring algorithm to blur s as long as:
αmin ≤ f(g(s, αactual)) ≤ αmax
This enables the infrastructure to provide the target with additional privacy.
6.2.4 Location Translation
Location translation is the process of converting a location expressed using one
representation into the same location expressed using a different representation.
The functions used to perform location translations are always either one-to-one
functions or many-to-one functions.
It is important to note that both the original location representation and the
translated location representation can be any type of location representation (see
Section 2.3.1). It is also important to note that location translation functions can
change the accuracy of the location information. In particular, the one-to-one loca-
tion translation functions will not change the accuracy of the location information,
whereas the many-to-one location translation functions will decrease the accuracy
of the location information.
The most relevant types of location translation functions are mathematical-to-
mathematical, political-to-mathematical, and mathematical-to-political location trans-
lation functions. Political-to-mathematical location translation functions are of-
ten known as geocoding functions, and mathematical-to-political location trans-
lation functions are often known as reverse geocoding functions. Mathematical-
to-mathematical location translation functions are one-to-one location translation
functions where there is no change in the location accuracy. Both political-to-
mathematical location translation functions and mathematical-to-political location
translation functions can be either one-to-one, in which case there is no change in the
location accuracy, or many-to-one, in which case there is a decrease in the location
accuracy.
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6.3 Requirements
We have identified the following requirements that our sighting blurring algorithm
must satisfy:
• Requirement 1
The sighting blurring algorithm will generate sightings with exactly
the requested sighting accuracy.
In particular, the sighting blurring algorithm must not generate sightings that
have a greater sighting accuracy than the requested sighting accuracy because
this could compromise the target’s privacy. Similarly, the sighting blurring
algorithm must not generate sightings that have a lower sighting accuracy
than the requested sighting accuracy because this could reduce the usefulness
of the LBS. Therefore, the requested sighting accuracy must be greater than
or equal to the minimum sighting accuracy that is required by the indirect
requester and proxy requester pair, and less than or equal to the maximum
sighting accuracy that is allowed by the target.
• Requirement 2
The sighting blurring algorithm will generate sightings consisting of
locations and time intervals that contain the targets.
It is necessary that the generated blurred sightings are always correct, because
otherwise the proxy requester would be providing a service that would be
perceived as being incorrect by the indirect requester. This could undermine
the acceptance and take-up of LBSs.
• Requirement 3
The only sightings required as input by the sighting blurring algo-
rithm will be the current sightings of the targets.
In particular, the sighting blurring algorithm must be independent of the sight-
ings of any other users. Therefore, the sighting blurring algorithm cannot be
influenced by factors such as the proximity of other users to the target. This
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is critical because the infrastructure may not be able to obtain sightings of
other users due to limitations of the underlying technology of the locatables
in the network operators’ networks. Even if the network operator could sup-
ply sightings of these other users, the infrastructure will incur a charge for
each sighting. This would make the operation of the sighting blurring algo-
rithm costly. Additionally, the infrastructure may not be allowed to obtain
the sightings of the users who are not involved in the current invocation of the
LBS due to either the users’ privacy preferences or the legal requirements that
govern the use of their sightings.
• Requirement 4
The sighting blurring algorithm will blur sightings so that the target
could be located anywhere within the location at any instant within
the time interval with equal probability.
The privacy offered to the target would be compromised if this requirement
were not satisfied.
• Requirement 5
The sighting blurring algorithm must be capable of blurring sight-
ings that are part of a stream of sightings of a particular target,
and knowledge of previous blurred sightings should not affect the
sighting accuracy of any future sightings.
The privacy offered to the target would be compromised if this requirement
were not satisfied.
• Requirement 6
The sighting blurring algorithm must be capable of generating blurred
sightings with a consistent sighting accuracy.
This will facilitate the creation of consistent LBSs, which in turn will encourage
the usage of these LBSs by users.
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In Section 6.5.3 we will compare our sighting blurring algorithm and its require-
ments with the related research described in Section 3.4.
6.4 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
In this section we describe the concepts, requirements, and restrictions of our sighting
blurring algorithm. We also provide a detailed description of our sighting blurring
algorithm, which we have developed to address the requirements described in Section
6.3.
6.4.1 Concepts
There are several concepts that we use as building blocks in the description of our
sighting blurring algorithm.
Magnitudes
A magnitude is a number that describes a quantity of length. Magnitudes are
denoted as m1, m2, m3, . . . , and they form a sequence M. This is denoted as
follows:
M = 〈m1,m2,m3, . . . ,mn〉
There are two properties that all magnitudes satisfy:
• Every magnitude in the sequence is greater than the following magnitude.
That is, mj > mj+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
• Every magnitude in the sequence is an integer multiple of the following mag-
nitude. That is, mj+1|mj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Typical values for these magnitudes that are likely to be useful from a user’s
perspective might be 100,000m, 10,000m, 1,000m, 100m, and 10m.
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Figure 6.1: Grid Examples (Maps c© Google Maps)
Grids
For each magnitude, the area that the sighting blurring algorithm covers is divided
into a grid of non-overlapping squares with a common origin. Each square in this
grid has a side length that is equal to the magnitude, and each of these squares is in
a fixed location. The reason for specifying that the grid squares are non-overlapping
and in fixed locations is to prevent an attacker from calculating the intersection of
two or more squares.
An example of three different grids covering the same area is shown in Figure
6.1. The square in Figure 6.1 (a) has a side length of 100,000m, and this is ten times
greater than the side length of each square in Figure 6.1 (b). Similarly, each square
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in Figure 6.1 (b) has a side length that is ten times greater than the side length of
each square in Figure 6.1 (c).
Locations
A location within any grid is simply a square. Every square in every grid can be
specified by the coordinates of its southwest corner, and the magnitude of the square
side. Therefore, a location can be specified as (x ×mj , y ×mj ,mj). Alternatively,
if M is known, then a location can be specified as (x, y, j).
Durations
A duration is a number that describes an amount of time, rather than an absolute
time. Durations are denoted as d1, d2, d3, . . . , and they form a sequence D. This is
denoted as follows:
D = 〈d1, d2, d3, . . . , dn〉
There are several properties that all duration sequences satisfy. These are:
• Every duration in the sequence is greater than the following duration. That
is, dj > dj+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
• For every magnitude in M there is a corresponding duration in D. That is,
|M| = |D|.
• Each duration is chosen to enable a target who is in a grid square of magnitude
mj to move to any location inside an adjacent square in the duration dj .
Therefore, each dj is calculated by dividing this distance by the average speed
of a typical target.
These durations are pre-determined average values rather than dynamic values
for a specific target for two reasons. Firstly, our sighting blurring algorithm is not
aware of that specific target’s current speed and direction due to Requirement 3.
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Secondly, the requester may gain additional information pertaining to that target’s
current speed and direction by observing how its durations are changing.
It is worth noting that mj/dj is not constant for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is
because the average speed of a typical target will vary depending on the distance
that it travels and the duration. For example, if the average speed is calculated over
a relatively small distance and duration, then the average speed will be quite slow.
However, as the distance and duration increase it is more likely that the average
speed of the target increases also. This is because targets tend to travel faster when
they have greater distances to travel.
Therefore, a time interval can be specified as (t, dj). Alternatively, if D is known,
then a time interval can be specified as (t, j).
Sightings
We previously stated that a sighting consisted of a location and a time interval.
We denoted this as s = 〈l, i〉. We have also stated that a location can be specified
within the context of our sighting blurring algorithm as (x, y, j). We can also specify
the time interval within the context of our sighting blurring algorithm as (t, j).
Therefore, we can redefine a sighting as s = 〈(x×mj , y ×mj), t,mj , dj〉, or if both
M and D are known, then a sighting can be specified as s = 〈(x, y), t, j〉.
Sighting Accuracies
In the context of our sighting blurring algorithm a magnitude is used to specify the
side length of the grid square that represents the target’s location, and the duration
is used to specify for how long the sighting is valid, and hence to determine how
frequently new sightings are created for the target.
Therefore, the sighting accuracy is based on (mj , dj), and f1 can be redefined as
follows:
f1(⊥) = 0
f1(〈(x×mj , y ×mj), t,mj , dj〉) = 1
m2j × dj
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If bothM and D are known, then we can define a new sighting accuracy function
f2 ∈ A as follows:
f2(⊥) = 0
f2(〈(x, y), t, j〉) = j
6.4.2 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
In this section we provide both a description and a formal definition of our sighting
blurring algorithm.
Overview
The basis for our sighting blurring algorithm is that it offers targets increased privacy
by performing spatial blurring on the location components of their sightings. In
particular, it blurs a target’s input sighting for an indirect requester and proxy
requester pair by producing a new sighting with a larger location component. It
does not perform temporal blurring, because this reduces an LBS’s ability to offer
a useful service. Instead, our sighting blurring algorithm will not produce any new
blurred sightings of the target for the same indirect requester and proxy requester
pair until a specific duration has elapsed. This has the effect of limiting the frequency
with which new sightings can be obtained for a target by an indirect requester and
proxy requester pair, and this frequency is a function of the area of the location
component of the sighting that was produced by the spatial blurring. Therefore,
our sighting blurring algorithm is a combination of a spatial blurring algorithm and
a frequency based blurring algorithm.
Inputs and Output
Our sighting blurring algorithm requires the following five inputs:
• The public name of the indirect requester.
• The public name of the proxy requester.
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• The public name of the target.
• The input sighting of the target, which is denoted as sinput = 〈(xinput, yinput),
tinput, input〉. Therefore, its sighting accuracy is calculated as f2(sinput) =
input, where input ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
• The desired sighting accuracy of the output sighting. This is denoted as output,
where output ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The sighting accuracy of the input sighting must
be greater than or equal to the desired sighting accuracy of the output sighting.
That is, input ≥ output.
The output of our sighting blurring algorithm is a blurred sighting, which is de-
noted as soutput = 〈(xoutput, youtput), toutput, output〉. Therefore, its sighting accuracy
is calculated as f2(soutput) = output.
Description
The first time that our sighting blurring algorithm is requested to blur a sighting of
the target using the desired sighting accuracy of output, for each indirect requester
and proxy requester pair, it operates as follows:
1. It chooses the grid that has a side length of moutput.
2. From this grid it chooses the square that fully contains the input location
(xinput, yinput, input). This square is used to identify the blurred location, and
it is denoted as (xoutput, youtput, output). The blurred location will always fully
contain the input location, due to the way that magnitudes and grids are
defined.
3. It creates toutput so that it is equal to tinput.
4. The blurred sighting soutput = 〈(xoutput, youtput), toutput, output〉 is generated,
stored, and returned.
If the same indirect requester and proxy requester pair require the sighting blur-
ring algorithm to blur a new input sighting sinput′ = 〈(xinput′ , yinput′), tinput′ , input〉,
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for the same target with the same desired sighting accuracy of output, then it will
operate as follows:
1. It compares the current time, tcurrent, with the toutput and output of the pre-
vious blurred sighting soutput.
2. If less time than doutput has elapsed since toutput, then soutput is returned again.
3. If more time than doutput has elapsed since toutput, then soutput′ = 〈(xoutput′ ,
youtput′), toutput′ , output〉 is generated, stored in place of soutput, and returned.
The reason for examining the current time and the previous blurred sighting
before deciding which output sighting to release is that it prevents an attacker from
obtaining several sightings in quick succession, and then determining the instant
that the target moves from a square into an adjacent square. Clearly, the target’s
location at that moment is on the border of the two squares.
Algorithm
Our sighting blurring algorithm is described formally in the blurSighting method,
which is described in Algorithm 3. This method requires the use of a data structure
with suitable methods, which is capable of storing sightings for a fixed duration.
Note that for the sake of simplicity we have included sinput as an input parameter to
the blurSighting method, even though sinput might not be required. A more efficient
implementation would use input as an input parameter instead of sinput, and another
method within blurSighting that is capable of obtaining sinput immediately before it
is required.
The store method is used to store a sighting, which has a specified sighting
accuracy of a target that has been requested by an indirect requester and proxy
requester pair, in the data structure. This sighting will be stored for a fixed duration,
before it is discarded by another method in a separate thread. The store method is
described in Algorithm 4.
The retrieve method is used to retrieve a sighting, which has a specified sighting
accuracy of a target that has been requested by an indirect requester and proxy
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Algorithm 3: The blurSighting Method
Input: B1 is the public name of the target.
Input: A1 is the public name of the indirect requester.
Input: L1 is the public name of the proxy requester.
Input: sinput = 〈(xinput, yinput), tinput, input〉 is the input sighting of the
target.
Input: output is the desired sighting accuracy of the output sighting.
Output: soutput is the output sighting.
Data: Access to M.
// If the output sighting accuracy is greater than the input
sighting accuracy, then terminate the method
if output > input then
soutput = ⊥
return soutput
end
soutput = retrieve(B1, A1, L1, output)
// If there is no stored blurred sighting, then create a new one
if soutput == ⊥ then
// Round both the x and y coordinates down
xoutput = ((xinput ×minput)− ((xinput ×minput) mod moutput))/moutput
youtput = ((yinput ×minput)− ((yinput ×minput) mod moutput))/moutput
toutput = tinput
soutput = 〈(xoutput, youtput), toutput, output〉
store(B1, A1, L1, soutput)
return soutput
end
// Otherwise return the stored blurred sighting
else
return soutput
end
requester pair, from the data structure. If a suitable sighting does not exist then ⊥
is returned. This method is described in Algorithm 5.
6.4.3 Input Sighting Pre-Processing
Our sighting blurring algorithm assumes that the underlying positioning technology
is capable of producing raw sightings that are accurate with a high confidence level.
Therefore, it is easy to produce the input sightings for our sighting blurring algorithm
using these raw sightings.
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Algorithm 4: The store Method
Input: B1 is the public name of the target.
Input: A1 is the public name of the indirect requester.
Input: L1 is the public name of the proxy requester.
Input: s = 〈(x, y), t, α〉 is the sighting to store.
Data: Access to D.
// Write 〈B1, A1, L1, α, s〉 to thread-safe persistent storage
write〈B1, A1, L1, α, s〉
// This method assumes that there is another method in a
separate thread that removes sightings from the persistent
storage when they expire
// A sighting expires when currentT ime() > (t+ dα), where
currentT ime() is a method that gets the current time from the
system
return
Algorithm 5: The retrieve Method
Input: B1 is the public name of the target.
Input: A1 is the public name of the indirect requester.
Input: L1 is the public name of the proxy requester.
Input: α is the sighting accuracy.
Output: s is the stored sighting.
// Return the sighting if it exists in the thread-safe
persistent storage
if 〈B1, A1, L1, α, s〉 exists then
return s
end
else
return ⊥
end
However, in certain circumstances we must do some pre-processing on the raw
sightings that are used to produce the input sightings for our sighting blurring al-
gorithm. In particular, the raw sightings may come from a wide variety of network
operators, which might all use different underlying positioning technologies. There-
fore, the raw sightings may be heterogeneous. In order for our sighting blurring
algorithm to work, we require that these raw sightings be homogenised.
As an example, consider a raw sighting with a location that is represented using
a circle. This circle is defined using a point for its centre, and it has a radius of
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Figure 6.2: Raw Sighting Example (Maps c© Google Maps)
250m. This circle is denoted as lraw, and it is shown in Figure 6.2 (a). The problem
with lraw is that it does not fit into any single square in the example grid shown in
Figure 6.2 (b), because each square in this grid has a side length of 100m. Therefore,
the homogenisation process will choose a square from the grid with the smallest side
length so that the raw location is fully contained within a single square. This is the
example grid shown in Figure 6.2 (c) where the side length of each square is 1,000m.
This homogenisation process causes the sighting accuracy of the input sightings
to decrease. In certain circumstances this decrease might be significant enough to
prevent the sighting blurring algorithm from being invoked since the input sighting
accuracy will be less than the desired output sighting accuracy. In this case the
requesters are provided with a generic error message so that they cannot determine
that the sighting blurring algorithm was not invoked due to the location component
of the target’s raw sighting. Therefore, this homogenisation process is not ideal, and
we have identified this as an area for further investigation in Section 7.5.3.
By homogenising the raw sightings like this, we are able to guarantee that the
input sightings have locations that really do contain the targets. Therefore, our
sighting blurring algorithm always produces blurred sightings that are correct.
6.4.4 Design Restrictions
Our sighting blurring algorithm is designed to satisfy our requirements within the
context of our architecture. As part of this design, we have made two restrictions
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to its operation.
Firstly, our sighting blurring algorithm covers two-dimensional areas rather than
three-dimensional spaces. Our reason for not using three-dimensional spaces is that
targets rarely travel freely in the vertical direction, and their vertical locations are
normally on, or very close to, the local ground level. Therefore, although blurring
the vertical locations would give mathematically smaller sighting accuracies, it would
not provide the targets with greater sighting privacy in reality.
Secondly, our sighting blurring algorithm is only capable of producing sightings
with a limited number of different sighting accuracies. In practice we do not expect
this to be a limitation if the sighting accuracies are chosen to cover a wide range.
6.5 Analysis
In this section we provide a theoretical analysis of our sighting blurring algorithm.
First, we describe the scenarios in which our sighting blurring algorithm can be
invoked. We then introduce an attack model, and we describe how our sighting
blurring algorithm mitigates against these attacks. Finally, we compare our sighting
blurring algorithm with the related research identified in Section 3.4.
6.5.1 Usage Scenarios
There are two different scenarios in which our sighting blurring algorithm can be
invoked by an indirect requester and proxy requester pair for a particular target using
a particular sighting accuracy. In the first scenario our sighting blurring algorithm
is invoked infrequently, so that the time between invocations is greater than doutput.
This scenario represents a series of once-off invocations, and this is likely to suit
LBSs that provide an infrequent service relative to doutput.
Consider the first request to invoke our sighting blurring algorithm, r1, as shown
in Figure 6.3. The returned blurred sighting, s1, states that the target was within
the grid square specified by (x1 × mj , y1 × mj) and moutput, at some time during
the time interval defined by toutput and doutput. If s1 was output at t1, then t1 will
occur shortly after toutput and long before the time interval defined by toutput and
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Figure 6.3: Sequence Diagram Showing an Indirect Requester and Proxy Requester
Pair Invoking the Sighting Blurring Algorithm Infrequently
doutput passes. Therefore, the real time interval during which the target was sighted
is between toutput and t1, and hence s1 is very fresh. This effectively means that no
temporal blurring was used to produce s1. The same scenario is repeated again for
r2 and s2 in Figure 6.3.
In the second scenario the algorithm is invoked frequently, so that the time
between invocations is less than doutput. Therefore, this scenario constitutes tracking
the target.
Consider the request for invocation, r3, as shown in Figure 6.4. The correspond-
ing blurred sighting, s3, is very fresh. However, when r4 and r5 are made within the
duration doutput after s3, the sighting blurring algorithm will return s3 each time.
Now the real time interval during which the target was sighted has increased, and
hence s3 is increasingly less fresh. This is true for all additional invocations within
the duration doutput of the last blurred sighting.
The next request, r6, is made after the duration doutput after s3. Therefore, the
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Figure 6.4: Sequence Diagram Showing an Indirect Requester and Proxy Requester
Pair Invoking the Sighting Blurring Algorithm Frequently
sighting blurring algorithm will return a new sighting, s4, which will be returned in
response to all additional requests made within the duration doutput after s4. This
same scenario is repeated again for r9, r10, and r11 in Figure 6.4.
The combination of these two scenarios has the effect of making additional in-
vocations within the duration doutput of the last blurred sighting meaningless, and
therefore there is no incentive for the indirect requester and proxy requester pair
to make these requests. In fact, there may be a disincentive if they are charged for
each invocation. Therefore, our sighting blurring algorithm can be considered to be
more meaningful to indirect requester and proxy requester pairs that infrequently
invoke it relative to doutput.
We specify the frequency with which new sightings are released in terms of toutput
and doutput, rather than using predetermined times and doutput, because this ensures
that infrequent requests relative to doutput receive fresher sightings.
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6.5.2 Attack Model
Our attack modes assumes that there will not be any external attackers, because
we assume that they do not have access to the sightings due to a combination of
the data security techniques described in Chapter 4 and the access control model
described in Chapter 5. Therefore, we consider that an attacker is either an indirect
requester or proxy requester, and hence the target is willing to be sighted by the
attacker to some extent. We assume that the attacker cannot collude with other
indirect requesters or proxy requesters. The attacker is able to obtain a real-time
stream of blurred sightings of a particular target, and it can store these sightings.
The goal of the attacker is to compute sightings that are more accurate than the
sightings that it is allowed to obtain, and these computed sightings may occur in
the past, the present, or the future.
Within our attack model we have identified three different types of attack that
can be used by an attacker.
Mathematical Attacks
Mathematical attacks are based on the geometrical properties of the targets’ sight-
ings. Perhaps the most obvious such attack is an intersection attack. This occurs
when the attacker is able to calculate the intersection of the location components of
several blurred sightings within a short time duration. Consider a sighting blurring
algorithm that blurs a target’s sightings by creating a sighting consisting of a ran-
domly located larger square that fully contains the target’s location. If a different
larger square is created each time the sighting blurring algorithm is invoked, then an
attacker can invoke the sighting blurring algorithm several times in quick succession,
and then calculate the intersection of these squares. This creates a sighting of the
target that has an increased sighting accuracy. This type of intersection attack is
also possible when the sighting blurring algorithm creates randomly sized blurred
locations. This concept is shown in Figure 6.5, where the target’s location is shown
as l, and the intersection of three blurred locations is shaded.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is resistant to this type of attack, because it
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Figure 6.5: Intersection Attack on the Location l
requires that all squares within any grid are non-overlapping, and in fixed locations.
However, the use of these grids with non-overlapping and fixed squares creates the
opportunity for another type of attack, which we refer to as a border attack. Consider
a sighting blurring algorithm that returns the target’s location as a square in such a
grid. An attacker can invoke this sighting blurring algorithm very frequently. If the
target remains within a single square within the grid, then the attacker will not be
able to calculate a more accurate sighting of the target. However, the instant that
the target moves from one square to another square within the grid, the attacker will
know that the target is on the border of these two squares. Therefore, the sighting
accuracy of the target’s sighting is significantly increased.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is resistant to this type of attack, because it lim-
its the frequency with which an attacker can obtain fresh sightings. This frequency
is chosen so that on average the target could be located anywhere within the new
location when the attacker obtains a sighting containing this new location.
Cartographical Attacks
Cartographical attacks use information relating to the physical features of a location
to create a sighting with a greater sighting accuracy. This type of information is
commonly available, and it is typically found on maps.
Consider the map shown in Figure 6.6 (a) that shows a railway running along
the coastline in a rural location with a sparse road network. Figure 6.6 (b) shows
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Figure 6.6: Cartographical Attack Example (Maps c© Google Maps)
the same location being superimposed by a grid of squares where each square has
a side length of 1,000m, and Figure 6.6 (c) shows the location components of a
target’s sightings. If an attacker observes a target travelling in these locations,
then it is most likely that the target is travelling on a train. This is because there
are no roads within many of these locations, and some of these locations contain
significant amounts of water. Therefore, the attacker can calculate a significantly
reduced location component for these sightings, as well as accurately predicting the
target’s future sightings.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is vulnerable to this type of attack, because
it is not aware of any physical features within its grids. However, the target can
avoid this type of attack by specifying a sighting accuracy in its permissions that
corresponds to a grid with sufficiently large squares.
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Sociological Attacks
Sociological attacks are based on the attacker having some knowledge of how society,
or a group within society, behaves. This enables the attacker to infer how a target
is likely to behave.
A common form of this type of attack, which we refer to as a home attack,
occurs when an attacker tries to locate a target’s home. There are several different
heuristics that an attacker can use. For example, the target’s home is likely to be
in the location where the target is at 3:00:00 every morning, or the target’s home
is likely to be in the location where the target spends the most time. This type
of attack can be undertaken manually, or automatically using reverse geocoding
services and electronic white pages [48]. A variation of this attack can be used by
the attacker to locate a target’s principle place of occupation.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is capable of partially resisting this type of at-
tack, because the attacker will be able to determine the square within the grid that
contains the target’s home. However, the attacker will be unable to determine the
location of the target’s home within this square if it contains more than one home.
Therefore, it is important that the target specifies a sighting accuracy in its permis-
sions that corresponds to a grid with sufficiently large squares relative to the urban
density around its home.
Another sociological attack, which we refer to as a return journey attack, can
occur after an attacker has determined the square within the grid that contains the
target’s home. This type of attack is based on the assumption that the target will
return home using the same route that it used to leave its home.
Again, our sighting blurring algorithm is capable of partially resisting this type
of attack, because the attacker will be able to predict the squares within the grid
that contain the target’s return journey. However, the attacker will be unable to
determine the target’s sightings with a greater sighting accuracy.
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6.5.3 Comparison with Related Research
In this section we describe how our sighting blurring algorithm satisfies the require-
ments that we identified in Section 6.3. We also compare it with the related research
described in Section 3.4 in terms of our requirements. In particular, we identify its
advantages and disadvantages, and we identify the similarities and differences be-
tween it and the related research.
• Requirement 1
The sighting blurring algorithm will generate sightings with exactly
the requested sighting accuracy.
Our sighting blurring algorithm satisfies this requirement because it is capa-
ble of generating blurred sightings that have the exact sighting accuracy that
is requested, as long as this requested sighting accuracy has a corresponding
value in the sequence of magnitudes. Furthermore, our sighting blurring algo-
rithm quantifies sighting accuracy in terms of the area of the spatially blurred
sightings and the durations for which they are valid.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm generating sightings with
exactly the requested sighting accuracy is that it facilitates the creation of
consistent LBSs, and this in turn will encourage the usage of these LBSs by
users. The disadvantage of it satisfying this requirement is that it is unable to
generate more accurate sightings in certain circumstances when the targets’
security would not be decreased.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is similar to all of the sighting blurring al-
gorithms in the related research because they all generate blurred sightings.
However, our sighting blurring algorithm differs from all of the sighting blur-
ring algorithms in the related research because they all quantify sighting accu-
racies in terms of numbers of other users, probabilities, or dynamically varying
areas and durations.
• Requirement 2
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The sighting blurring algorithm will generate sightings consisting of
locations and time intervals that contain the targets.
Our sighting blurring algorithm always produces sightings consisting of loca-
tions and time intervals that are guaranteed to contain the target, although
the freshness of these sightings decreases if it is invoked frequently relative to
the durations of the sightings.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement
is that the LBSs always provide services that are perceived as being accurate
and correct by the users, and this in turn will encourage the usage of these
LBSs by the users.
Our sighting blurring algorithm differs from the probability based blurring al-
gorithms in the related research because they do not satisfy this requirement.
Furthermore, it differs from some of the spatial and temporal blurring algo-
rithms that do not support this requirement, because they will not generate
sightings of a target if it is in certain locations.
• Requirement 3
The only sightings required as input by the sighting blurring algo-
rithm will be the current sightings of the targets.
Our sighting blurring algorithm satisfies this requirement because it is only
dependent on the current sighting of the target, and it is independent of the
sightings of any other users.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement is
that it cannot be influenced by factors such as the proximity of other users to
the target. This is critical because this sighting knowledge may not be avail-
able due to limitations of the underlying positioning technology, the privacy
preferences of the users who are not involved in the current invocation of the
LBS, or the charges incurred for obtaining these sightings. The disadvantage
of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement is that it is un-
able to generate more accurate sightings in certain circumstances when the
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targets’ security would not be decreased.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is similar to the probability based blurring
algorithms and the political location blurring algorithms with regard to this
requirement. However, it differs from the anonymity based blurring algorithms
and the spatial and temporal blurring algorithms with regard to this require-
ment, because they all require knowledge of current sightings of the target and
other users. In particular, the spatial and temporal blurring algorithms that
are based on k-anonymity require knowledge of current sightings of the target
and every other user, in order to determine which users are the other k − 1
users.
Indeed, an attacker could exploit this property if it is close to the spatially
blurred location of a stationary target. Consider an attacker that receives a
spatially blurred location of a target that has a k-anonymity of 3, as shown
in Figure 6.7 (a). If the attacker enters the spatially blurred location and
invokes the sighting blurring algorithm it will receive a smaller spatially blurred
location because it has now replaced one of the k users. The attacker can
keep repeating this until moving closer would exclude a second user from the
k users. This is shown in Figure 6.7 (b). The attacker can then repeat the
process travelling along the other axis, as shown in Figure 6.7 (c). The attacker
can then use the intersection of these two smaller spatially blurred locations
to generate an even smaller spatially blurred location, as shown by the shaded
location in Figure 6.7 (c). Indeed, in this simple example the attacker can
accurately calculate the target’s location within this blurred location because
the target has a k-anonymity of 3.
• Requirement 4
The sighting blurring algorithm will blur sightings so that the target
could be located anywhere within the location at any instant within
the time interval with equal probability.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is designed to reduce the frequency with which
new sightings are released so that the target could have reached any location
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Figure 6.7: K-Anonymity Attack Example
within an adjacent location between sighting releases. The duration required to
ensure this is based on the average speed of an average user. This differs from
the frequency based blurring algorithm developed by Candebat, which uses
the current instantaneous speed of the target. Our sighting blurring algorithm
also differs from many of the other sighting blurring algorithms described in
the related research with regard to this requirement, because they do not use
time intervals.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement
is that it is resistant to mathematical attacks.
• Requirement 5
The sighting blurring algorithm must be capable of blurring sight-
ings that are part of a stream of sightings of a particular target,
and knowledge of previous blurred sightings should not affect the
sighting accuracy of any future sightings.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is capable of being invoked frequently to blur
sightings that are part of a stream of sightings for a particular target.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement is
that it prevents an attacker from mounting a mathematical attack by invoking
the sighting blurring algorithm frequently in order to calculate a new sighting
with a greater sighting accuracy.
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Our sighting blurring algorithm differs from the sighting blurring algorithms
in the related research with regard to this requirement, because they are all
vulnerable to this type of attack.
• Requirement 6
The sighting blurring algorithm must be capable of generating blurred
sightings with a consistent sighting accuracy.
Our sighting blurring algorithm generates sightings with a consistent sight-
ing accuracy, which is measured in terms of the area of the spatially blurred
sightings and the durations for which they are valid.
The advantage of our sighting blurring algorithm satisfying this requirement
is that it facilitates the creation of consistent LBSs, and this in turn will
encourage the usage of these LBSs by users. The disadvantage of it satisfying
this requirement is that it is unable to generate more accurate sightings in
certain circumstances when the targets’ security would not be decreased.
Our sighting blurring algorithm is similar to the probability based blurring
algorithms with regard to this requirement. However, it differs from the
anonymity based blurring algorithms, the political location blurring algorithms,
and the spatial and temporal blurring algorithms with regard to this require-
ment, because they all generate sightings with variable sighting accuracies that
are measured in terms of the area of the spatially blurred sightings.
Finally, our sighting blurring algorithm is similar to the anonymity based blurring
algorithms with regard to supporting anonymous users. However, it differs from
the anonymity based blurring algorithms because it does not require anonymity.
Therefore, it is similar to many of the other sighting blurring algorithms with regard
to supporting identified users. Although this was not an original requirement for
our sighting blurring algorithm, it is an advantage that both anonymous users and
identified users can be supported because it provides users with greater choice, and
it facilitates LBSs that require some form of persistent identification.
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6.6 Evaluation
In this section we describe the practical evaluation of our sighting blurring algorithm.
First, we describe how we collected our sample sightings, and we provide an analysis
of these sample sightings. We then describe the testbed that we used to implement
and evaluate our sighting blurring algorithm. Finally, we evaluate our sighting
blurring algorithm using the sample sightings and the testbed, and we present our
results.
6.6.1 Sample Sightings
Ideally, we would have liked to evaluate our sighting blurring algorithm using real
sightings of real users in real-time. However, this was not realistic due to the costs
involved of reporting sightings in real-time, the inconvenience and complexity caused
to users by requiring them to carry bulkier and more complex locatables, and the
uncertainty and unpredictability of the input sightings.
Instead, we asked ten family members and friends to provide us with their sight-
ings, and we supplied them with locatables based on GPS. A typical session during
which the participants used the locatables lasted for approximately two or three
days. They were shown how to switch their locatables on and off, and it was sug-
gested to them that they switch off their locatables when they were in the same
location for more than a few minutes.
After we collected each session, we displayed it using Google Maps [35], and we
showed it to the participant. We asked him/her to describe the various journeys that
occurred during the session. In particular, we enquired about the mode of transport
used for each journey, and the answers we received were: on foot, bicycle, car, tram,
city bus, and intercity bus.
These sessions provided us with more than 280,000 unique sightings, and ap-
proximately 100 journeys. We estimate by visual inspection that the location in the
recorded sighting was always within 100m of the real location, and that it was often
within 10m of the real location.
We found that the overall average journey distance was 27,108m with a stan-
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dard deviation of 37,137m, the overall average journey duration was 3,972s with a
standard deviation of 3,349s, and the overall average journey speed was 6.22m/s
with a standard deviation of 3.93m/s. The fact that these standard deviations are
relatively large is not surprising due to the wide range of modes of transport, and
hence a wide range of journey types.
In order to provide a more meaningful overview of the journeys for which we have
sightings, we re-evaluated them based on the mode of transport used. The average
journey distance and standard deviation for each mode of transport is shown in
Figure 6.8. The standard deviations for journeys where the mode of transport was
on foot, tram, or city bus are all relatively small since these modes of transport are
normally used for specific types of journeys. The standard deviations for journeys
where the mode of transport was either bicycle or car are relatively large. In the
case of journeys made by bicycle this is because some of the journeys were short
commutes, while other journeys were part of training sessions for cycling races. In
the case of journeys made by car this is because cars are equally suited to both
short and long journeys. The standard deviation for journeys where the mode of
transport was intercity bus is almost zero because all of these journeys were made
between a single pair of locations.
The average journey duration and standard deviation for each mode of trans-
port is shown in Figure 6.9. The standard deviations for journeys where the mode of
transport was either bicycle or car are relatively large, and this is expected based on
the standard deviations shown in Figure 6.8. The standard deviation for journeys
where the mode of transport was on foot is also relatively large. This is probably
because travelling on foot is relatively slow compared to the other modes of trans-
port, and therefore a variation in the average journey duration does not cause a
significant variation in the average journey distance. The standard deviations for
journeys where the mode of transport was tram, city bus, or intercity bus are all
relatively small since these modes of transport are normally used for specific types
of journeys.
Finally, the average journey speed and standard deviation for each mode of
transport is shown in Figure 6.10. The standard deviation for journeys where the
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Figure 6.8: The Average Journey Distance and Standard Deviation for each Mode
of Transport
Figure 6.9: The Average Journey Duration and Standard Deviation for each Mode
of Transport
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Figure 6.10: The Average Journey Speed and Standard Deviation for each Mode of
Transport
mode of transport was car is the largest. This is due to the fact that cars are
used in both urban environments that suffer from heavy traffic congestion, and
extra-urban environments where traffic can flow freely without being impeded. The
standard deviation for journeys where the mode of transport was bicycle is also
relatively large. Again, this is due to the fact that bicycles were used for both slow
commutes and fast training sessions. The relatively small standard deviations for
journeys where the mode of transport was on foot, tram, city bus, or intercity bus
suggest that these modes of transport are somewhat immune to variations in their
environments.
6.6.2 Testbed
We have developed a prototype implementation, which we use as a testbed, in order
to evaluate our sighting blurring algorithm with respect to our sample sightings.
Sighting Server
We have developed a sighting server that simulates a network operator, which can
be queried using a location protocol (see Section 2.3.3) in order to obtain a sighting
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of a target. Our sighting server uses the sample sightings, and it is capable of
interpolating these sightings for the time intervals when the locatable was switched
off.
Each sighting request to the sighting server contains a time parameter that the
sighting server uses instead of the current time. This enables us to replay our sample
sightings in real-time.
Magnitudes and Grids
Our testbed uses the following sequence of magnitudes, where each magnitude is
specified in metres:
M = 〈100000, 10000, 1000, 100〉
Therefore, we are using four different grids within our testbed.
Locations
The locatables used by the participants all recorded locations using the WGS 84
format (see Section 2.3.2). This format is not optimum for performing distance
based calculations within relatively small areas, so instead we decided to use the
Irish Grid (see Section 2.3.2) to represent locations. This format is particularly
suitable for our evaluation because it is a coordinate reference system that uses
the metre as its unit of length. Therefore, we used a mathematical-to-mathematical
location translation to convert all of the recorded locations from the WGS 84 format
to the Irish Grid format.
Durations
Calculating appropriate durations is critical for the successful operation of our sight-
ing blurring algorithm. We have already stated that each duration is calculated by
dividing the average distance required to move to any location in an adjacent square
by the average journey speed of a typical target.
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Calculating the average distance required to move to any location in an adja-
cent square requires us to calculate the maximum distance required to move to any
location in an adjacent square. We assume that the squares in the grid have a side
length of mj , and that the average location in the initial square is its centre. There
are four adjacent squares where the minimum distance required to move beyond
them is 1.5mj , and there are four diagonally adjacent squares where the maximum
distance required to move beyond them is 1.5
√
2mj . Therefore, we calculate the
average distance required to move to any location in an adjacent square as follows:
Average Distance =
4(1.5mj) + 4(1.5
√
2mj)
8
=
6mj + 6
√
2mj
8
=
6 + 6
√
2
8
mj
u 1.8mj
Calculating the average journey speed of a typical target is more difficult. If
the average journey speed is too slow, then the duration will be too large and the
sighting blurring algorithm will unnecessarily reduce the frequency with which it
produces blurred sightings. Conversely, if the average journey speed is too fast,
then the duration will be too small and the sighting blurring algorithm will not
provide the target with sufficient privacy.
We could use the overall average journey speed of 6.22m/s that we obtained
from our sample sightings. However, this is likely to give poor performance due to
its relatively large standard deviation.
We could use the target’s current journey speed, or the target’s average journey
speed based on its mode of transport. However, our sighting blurring algorithm
is not aware of either the target’s current journey speed, or the target’s mode of
transport.
Instead, we re-evaluated our sightings based on the average journey distance.
We calculated the average journey speed and standard deviation for each range of
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Figure 6.11: The Average Journey Speed and Standard Deviation for each Range
Defined by our Magnitudes
average journey distances defined by our magnitudes, and the results are shown in
Figure 6.11.
We then calculated each duration by dividing 1.8mj by these average journey
speeds. Therefore our testbed uses the following sequence of durations, where each
duration is specified in seconds:
D = 〈13916, 2450, 581, 100〉
These durations are approximately 4 hours, 40 minutes, 10 minutes, and 2 min-
utes. The maximum frequencies with which new sightings are released based on
these durations are 6 times per day, 35 times per day, 148 times per day, and 862
times per day.
Algorithm
We have implemented our sighting blurring algorithm as described in Algorithm 3.
For the purpose of evaluation, we added an additional input parameter, tsimulated,
which represents a time to use instead of the current time. This enabled us to replay
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our sample sightings in real-time.
The input sighting of the target is sinput = 〈(xinput, yinput), tinput, 4〉, and its
sighting accuracy is calculated as f2(sinput) = 4. The desired sighting accuracy of
the output sighting is output, where output ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
6.6.3 Example Attacks
We evaluated our sighting blurring algorithm by emulating an attacker that fre-
quently requests a target’s sightings with a constant sighting accuracy over a 24
hour period starting at 00:00:00 and ending at 23:59:59. Since our sighting blurring
algorithm is resistant to mathematical attacks, as described in Section 6.5.2, we
focused on testing it against cartographical attacks and sociological attacks.
Example 1
This example is based on a target that lives in the centre of Dublin. The target
walked to DCU in the morning, and returned to the city centre in the evening using
a city bus. The route walked in the morning was different to the route used by the
city bus in the evening. The target’s raw locations are shown in Figure 6.12 (a).
Figure 6.12 (b) shows the location components of the target’s blurred sightings
using a sighting accuracy of 4, and Figure 6.12 (c) shows the location components
of the target’s blurred sightings using a sighting accuracy of 3. For both of these
sighting accuracies, the mean distance between successive distinct blurred locations
is approximately 1.4moutput and the standard deviation is approximately 0.8moutput.
The blurred location of the target’s home and place of work can be correctly
identified in both of these cases using sociological attacks (the blurred location con-
taining the target at 03:00:00 represented approximately 52% of the target’s blurred
locations, and the blurred location containing the target at 15:00:00 represented
approximately 45% of the target’s blurred locations).
The sighting accuracy of 4 does not offer the target significant protection from
cartographical attacks because there is generally only one road within any of the
blurred locations. Furthermore, the blurred location that represents the target’s
place of work is fully contained within the university campus. An attacker can also
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Figure 6.12: Sighting Blurring Algorithm Example 1 (Maps c© Google Maps)
observe that the target’s speed was significantly faster in the evening compared to
the morning.
The risk posed by cartographical attacks in this example is significantly reduced
by using a sighting accuracy of 3 because there are more viable roads and buildings
that could contain the target within any blurred location. In both cases, the target’s
home cannot be identified within the blurred location because it contains an area of
high-density housing.
Example 2
The example shown in Figure 6.13 (a) is based on a target that is a researcher
in DCU, and the target lives in the student residences that are on the university
campus. The target drove to UCD for a collaboration meeting in the morning, and
drove home in the evening. The route used on both occasions had small variations
in the city centre due to the use of one-way streets. Figure 6.13 (b) shows the
location components of the target’s blurred sightings using a sighting accuracy of 3.
In this example, the mean distance between successive distinct blurred locations is
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Figure 6.13: Sighting Blurring Algorithm Example 2 (Maps c© Google Maps)
approximately 2.4moutput and the standard deviation is approximately 1.1moutput.
The blurred location of the target’s home can be correctly identified using soci-
ological attacks (the blurred location containing the target at 03:00:00 represented
approximately 50% of the target’s blurred locations). However, it is not possible to
identify the target’s home as the student residences using a cartographical attack,
because there are private residences within the same blurred location. The blurred
location where the target was located during working hours can be correctly identi-
fied using sociological attacks (the blurred location containing the target at 15:00:00
represented approximately 45% of the target’s blurred locations). However, this is
not the target’s main place of work, and this fact can be observed over a period of
five working days. Indeed, on any of the other working days in this week the blurred
location containing the target’s home represented approximately 96% of the target’s
blurred locations.
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Example 3
The example shown in Figure 6.14 (a) is based on a target that lives in a rural
environment that is approximately 50,000m southwest of Dublin. The target drove
to the city centre, collected some passengers, and then drove them to the airport.
The target then drove home.
Figure 6.14 (b) shows the location components of the target’s blurred sightings
using a sighting accuracy of 3. Since the target was travelling mostly on motorways,
and the sightings were recorded on a Saturday, the target was travelling signifi-
cantly faster than average. Therefore, the mean distance between successive dis-
tinct blurred locations is approximately 5.8moutput and the standard deviation is
approximately 3.5moutput. However, it would be relatively easy to use a cartograph-
ical attack on any blurred location that is outside of the city, since many of these
blurred locations contain only a single road.
Figure 6.14 (c) shows the location components of the target’s blurred sightings
using a sighting accuracy of 2. In this case, the mean distance between successive
distinct blurred locations is approximately 1.9moutput and the standard deviation is
approximately 1.1moutput. The risk posed by cartographical attacks in this example
is significantly reduced because there are more viable roads that could contain the
target within any blurred location.
In both of these cases, the blurred location of the target’s home can be correctly
identified using sociological attacks (the blurred location containing the target at
03:00:00 represented approximately 75% of the target’s blurred locations).
Cartographical attacks can be used with the blurred location of the target’s home
that has a sighting accuracy of 3, because there are less than 10 homes within this
blurred location. However, the target’s home cannot be located within the blurred
location that has a sighting accuracy of 2, because there are several towns and many
rural homes within this blurred location.
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Figure 6.14: Sighting Blurring Algorithm Example 3 (Maps c© Google Maps)
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Figure 6.15: Sighting Blurring Algorithm Example 4 (Maps c© Google Maps)
Example 4
This example is based on the target from the previous example driving to Cork city
centre, and staying there for a weekend. The target’s raw locations are shown in
Figure 6.15 (a).
Figure 6.15 (b) shows the location components of the target’s blurred sightings
using a sighting accuracy of 1. In this example, the mean distance between successive
distinct blurred locations is approximately 1.2moutput and the standard deviation is
approximately 0.3moutput. The risk posed by cartographical attacks in this example
is very low because the blurred locations are very large.
The blurred location of the target’s home can be correctly identified using soci-
ological attacks (the blurred location containing the target at 03:00:00 represented
approximately 43% of the target’s blurred locations). This sociological attack iden-
tifies the blurred location containing the city as the location of the target’s home on
the following days. However, the blurred location containing the target’s home can
be distinguished from the blurred location that the target visited by observing the
target’s blurred locations over a period of a week.
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6.6.4 Results
Our sighting blurring algorithm satisfies the requirements described in Section 6.3
due to its design, and therefore it is resistant to mathematical attacks. It provides
requesters who infrequently invoke it relative to doutput with fresh sightings con-
taining a blurred location component, as described in Section 6.5.1. Conversely, it
prevents requesters obtaining sightings of a target with a greater sighting accuracy
by frequently invoking it relative to doutput.
The sample sightings used in our example attacks are representative of our sam-
ple sightings, and the behaviour of our sighting blurring algorithm in the example
attacks is representative of its behaviour in attacks against any of our sample sight-
ings. Furthermore, the example attacks show that our sighting blurring algorithm is
resistant to cartographical attacks and sociological attacks if grids with sufficiently
large locations are used.
The durations used by our sighting blurring algorithm with our sample sightings
are appropriate for the specified magnitudes, because the mean distance between
successive distinct blurred locations is generally less than 2moutput and the standard
deviation is generally less than moutput.
6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we described the sighting blurring algorithm that we have developed,
which is implemented within the infrastructure in our architecture. Our sighting
blurring algorithm offers targets increased privacy by performing spatial blurring on
the location components of their sightings. Instead of performing temporal blurring,
our sighting blurring algorithm will not produce any new blurred sightings of the
target until a specific duration has elapsed. This has the effect of limiting the
frequency with which new sightings can be obtained for a target, and this frequency
is a function of the area of the location component of the sighting that was produced
by the spatial blurring.
There are three advantages of our sighting blurring algorithm compared to the
sighting blurring algorithms presented in the related research. Firstly, our sighting
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blurring algorithm is designed to be resistant to mathematical attacks based on fre-
quent sighting requests. Secondly, our sighting blurring algorithm generates blurred
sightings with a consistent sighting accuracy. Thirdly, our sighting blurring algo-
rithm is only dependent on the sightings of the targets that are directly involved in
a current LBS invocation, and it is independent of the sightings of all other users.
In conclusion, our sighting blurring algorithm can be used as part of an overall
solution for providing users with increased privacy while using LBSs.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we form our conclusions to this thesis. In particular, we identify
both the major contributions and the minor contributions of this thesis in terms of
our architecture and protocol, our access control model, and our sighting blurring
algorithm. We also identify several areas of the work described in this thesis that
require further investigation. Finally, we identify the publications that have arisen
as a result of the work described in this thesis.
7.2 Thesis Summary
This thesis can be summarised as follows:
• In Chapter 1 we provided an introduction to mobile devices, positioning tech-
nologies, and LBSs. We then described the problem statement that this thesis
addresses, together with the main goals of this thesis. Finally, we outlined the
unique contributions of this thesis.
• In Chapter 2 we described the background concepts that are relevant to this
thesis. In particular, we described the cryptographic concepts and the charg-
ing concepts that we built upon in Chapter 4, and we described the location
concepts that we built upon in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.
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• In Chapter 3 we described research efforts that are related to LBSs in terms
of architectures and protocols, access control models, and sighting blurring
algorithms.
• In Chapter 4 we described an architecture for users, an infrastructure, and
LBSs, which facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the Internet. We
also described a protocol that enables these three entities to achieve three-
party mutual identification and authentication. In particular, this protocol
allows users to simultaneously identify and authenticate themselves to the
infrastructure using one identity, and to the LBS using another identity. This
protocol then guarantees the confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of
all subsequent messages.
• In Chapter 5 we described an access control model that is implemented within
the infrastructure. This access control model is based on users who are targets
creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and for LBSs that
are proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled
to obtain sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings
are released, and the maximum accuracy of these sightings.
• In Chapter 6 we described the sighting blurring algorithm that we have de-
veloped, which is implemented within the infrastructure in our architecture.
Our sighting blurring algorithm offers users increased privacy by decreasing
the accuracy of their sightings based on the sighting accuracy allowed by the
access control model described in Chapter 5.
7.3 Major Contributions
In this section we describe the three major contributions of our work that are de-
scribed in this thesis. These contributions are a refinement of the contributions
described in Section 1.5.
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7.3.1 Architecture and Protocol
We have developed an architecture for users, LBSs, and an infrastructure, which
is a trusted middleware entity that facilitates the operation of these LBSs over the
Internet in a secure manner. In particular, the infrastructure provides common
functionality regarding the users’ identity information and sighting information.
We have also developed a protocol that is based on both the X.509 PKI and me-
diated identity based cryptography, and which uses this architecture, so that users,
LBSs, and an infrastructure can achieve three-party mutual identification and au-
thentication. This protocol allows users to simultaneously identify and authenticate
themselves to the infrastructure using an account name, and to the LBS using a
public name. Indeed, each user can be identified and authenticated using a different
public name with each LBS. This is achieved without requiring the mobile device to
have significantly greater resources, and without the need for additional messages to
be exchanged. This usage of public names with LBSs provides users with increased
privacy without necessarily reducing the usefulness of the LBSs. The confidentiality,
integrity, and non-repudiation of all subsequent messages can be guaranteed, and
we described how this can be used so that a user receives sighting information from
an LBS, which in turn receives this sighting information from the infrastructure.
7.3.2 Access Control Model
We have developed an access control model that is implemented within the infras-
tructure within our architecture. Our access control model is based on users who
are targets creating permissions for users who are indirect requesters, and for LBSs
that are proxy requesters. There are two types of permission within our access con-
trol model - IAPs that are used by indirect requesters, and PAPs that are used by
proxy requesters. These permissions specify which requesters are entitled to obtain
sightings of which targets, under what circumstances these sightings are released,
and the maximum accuracy of these sightings. Our access control model is then re-
sponsible for releasing users’ sightings in accordance with their permissions. When
an indirect requester and a proxy requester pair request a sighting of a target, they
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must supply the infrastructure with an IAP and a PAP.
The main novelty of our access control model is that it enables users to specify
two different types of permission - IAPs and PAPs. This has the effect of creating
a whitelist for users, and a separate whitelist for LBSs. The access control model
will only allow sightings to be released if it is presented with both a valid permission
specified in terms of users, and a valid permission specified in terms of LBSs.
7.3.3 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
We have developed a sighting blurring algorithm that offers targets increased privacy
by performing spatial blurring on the location components of their sightings. Instead
of performing temporal blurring, our sighting blurring algorithm will not produce
any new blurred sightings of the target until a specific duration has elapsed. This
has the effect of limiting the frequency with which new sightings can be obtained
for a target, and this frequency is a function of the area of the location component
of the sighting that was produced by the spatial blurring.
There are three advantages of our sighting blurring algorithm compared to the
sighting blurring algorithms presented in the related research. Firstly, our sighting
blurring algorithm is designed to be resistant to mathematical attacks based on fre-
quent sighting requests. Secondly, our sighting blurring algorithm generates blurred
sightings with a consistent sighting accuracy. Thirdly, our sighting blurring algo-
rithm is only dependent on the sightings of the targets that are directly involved in
a current LBS invocation, and it is independent of the sightings of all other users.
7.4 Minor Contributions
There are several minor contributions of our work that are described in this thesis:
• We have developed a real-time charging service that uses our protocol, and
this charging service is based on a revenue sharing model. Furthermore, our
charging service enables users to offer payments to LBSs using vouchers. This
is in contrast to LBSs taking payments from users. Therefore, our charging
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service gives users complete control over how much they pay LBSs, which in
turn reduces the amount of trust that these users must have in LBSs.
• We have collected more than 280,000 unique sightings from real users do-
ing their typical activities. We classified these sightings based on the mode of
transport used, and for each mode of transport we calculated the average jour-
ney distance, average journey duration, and average journey speed. Although
previous studies have collected sightings from real users, this is the first study
that we are aware of which collected sightings from users in Ireland.
• We used the sightings that we collected to calculate duration values corre-
sponding to the magnitudes that we used in our sighting blurring algorithm
testbed.
7.5 Future Work
Although this work in its current form is complete, we have identified several areas
related to our architecture and protocol, our access control model, and our sighting
blurring algorithm that require further investigation.
7.5.1 Architecture and Protocol
The areas related to our architecture and protocol that require further investigation
are:
• Our architecture and protocol are capable of supporting very flexible and novel
commercial relationships between the users, the infrastructure, and the LBSs.
We would like to identify these capabilities, and build upon them. Another
aspect of the charging that we would like to focus on is the reduction of the
trust needed by a user in a particular LBS.
• We would like to undertake more work on the implementation of our protocol.
In particular, we would like to use real mobile devices, and we would like to
do this in a way that requires the least amount of changes to their existing
software.
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7.5.2 Access Control Model
The areas related to our access control model that that require further investigation
are:
• Our access control model enables users to create many permissions that sup-
port very complex and personalised security specifications. Therefore, it is
possible that there will be many different combinations of IAPs and PAPs
that an indirect requester and proxy requester pair can use in order to ob-
tain a target’s sightings. We would like to investigate methods that allow
the indirect requesters and proxy requesters to select the most appropriate
combinations of IAPs and PAPs according to some criteria.
• In the distributed implementation of our access control model, both the in-
direct requesters and the proxy requesters are responsible for managing the
permissions that were created by the targets that they might need to sight.
We would like to investigate both methods that enable users to publish their
permissions, and methods that enable requesters to retrieve these permissions.
7.5.3 Sighting Blurring Algorithm
The areas related to our sighting blurring algorithm that require further investigation
are:
• We would like to continue testing and evaluating our sighting blurring al-
gorithm using new sample sightings from a wider group of participants. In
particular, we would like to assess the correctness of the values that we are
using as magnitudes and durations.
• We would like to develop an improved homogenisation process to pre-process
raw sightings that contain circular location components. In particular, this
improved homogenisation process should create input sightings with a consis-
tent sighting accuracy, and this sighting accuracy should not vary depending
on the target’s location.
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• We would like to investigate alternative approaches to deriving the values that
we are using as durations. A possible starting point is to consider varying the
durations based on the last released location of the target. This approach is
based on an observation that we made while evaluating our sighting blurring
algorithm that the mean distance and standard deviation between successive
distinct blurred locations varied significantly for a given target and magnitude
depending on the cartographical features of the location.
• We would like to study additional sociological techniques that can be used to
attack a target’s sightings that have been observed over an extended period of
time. It is possible that the findings of this study could help targets understand
the extent of sighting blurring that needs to be performed on their sightings,
and hence increase their privacy.
7.6 Publications Arising
There are three significant international peer-reviewed publications that have arisen
as a result of the work described in this thesis.
• The architecture and protocol described in Chapter 4 was presented at the
International Conference on Pervasive Services (ICPS) 2008 [28].
• The access control model described in Chapter 5 was presented at the Inter-
national Workshop on Security In Information Systems (WOSIS) 2008, which
was hosted as part of the International Conference on Enterprise Information
Systems (ICEIS) 2008 [29].
• The sighting blurring algorithm described in Chapter 6 was presented at the
International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction with Mobile De-
vices and Services (MobileHCI) 2008 [27].
The feedback regarding these three publications that was received from both the
anonymous reviewers, and the conference attendees, has been incorporated into this
thesis.
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7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we formed our conclusions to this thesis. In particular, we identified
both the major contributions and the minor contributions of this thesis in terms of
our architecture and protocol, our access control model, and our sighting blurring
algorithm. We also identified several areas of the work described in this thesis that
require further investigation. Finally, we identified the publications that have arisen
as a result of the work described in this thesis.
The overall goal of the work described in this thesis was to reduce the amount
of trust that users must have in both LBSs and other users by developing security
techniques for use with these LBSs. In particular, we described an architecture
and protocol, an access control model, and a sighting blurring algorithm which all
increase users’ security.
In conclusion, the security techniques described in this thesis can be used as
part of an overall solution for reducing the amount of trust that users must have
in LBSs, and that these security techniques form a significant contribution to any
future development of LBSs that operate on the Internet.
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List of Acronyms
API Application Programming Interface
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DCU Dublin City University
EU European Union
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System for Mobile communications
HTML HyperText Markup Language
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
IAP Indirect Access Permission
IBE Identity Based Encryption
IBS Identity Based Signature
LBS Location Based Service
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MLP Mobile Location Protocol
MMS Multimedia Messaging Service
OMA Open Mobile Alliance
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PAP Proxy Access Permission
PDA Personal Digital Assistant
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PoI Point of Interest
SMS Short Message Service
UCD University College Dublin
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
URL Uniform Resource Locator
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
WGS 84 World Geodetic System 1984
XML eXtensible Markup Language
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